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I. INTRODUCTION
"We came here to prove that Time Magazine lied ... [a]nd we managed
to prove that Time Magazine did lie."' General Ariel Sharon. "This libel
suit is over, and Time has won it."2 Statement of Time, Inc.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. New York Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
2. Id. at B4, col. 1.
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And so ended the lengthy litigation whereby Israeli Defense Minister Ariel
Sharon sought to vindicate his reputation following a January 25, 1985, Time
report on his alleged connection with the massacre of Palestinian civilians in
Beirut by Phalangist forces.'
This Article will assess the problem confronting a media-defamed plain-
tiff in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving an
individual's reputational rights and the media's first amendment rights. The
first amendment decisions have in effect erected insurmountable hurdles in
the path of such plaintiffs. This Article proposes a middle ground between
the common law strict liability standard in defamation actions and the Su-
preme Court's concerns with the media's constitutional "privilege," whereby
the truth or falsity of a publication may be established without the "chilling
effect" of excessive verdicts and the enormous legal expenses associated with
a traditional action for money damages. Section II will briefly trace and
analyze the development of the American common law of defamation until
the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.4 Section III will
consider the preoccupation of New York Times and St. Amant v. Thompson5
with the legal status of plaintiffs and defendants and the protection of the
privilege at the expense of the very essence of defamation law: the truth or
falsity of the publication. Section IV will examine the Supreme Court's strug-
gle in the ten years between New York Times and Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.6 to define the plaintiff's status in terms of the New York Times malice
standard. Section V will analyze the post-Gertz first amendment decisions
and the Supreme Court's lack of attention to the wants of the defamed
plaintiff. Section VI will consider various means which have been used or
proposed to aid restoration of reputation - all of which have been ineffec-
tive. Section VII will analyze a proposed alternative remedy, a judicial dec-
laration of falsity, which should be made available to a media-defamed
plaintiff. It would allow reputation to be vindicated without great expense
while at the same time the media's first amendment protections would not
be violated.
II. Trm COMMON LAW OF DEFAMATION
The law of defamation, comprising the twin torts of libel and slander,
has had a rather absurd history from its origins in the medieval English
ecclesiastical courts. Slander was regarded as a sin against God to be punished
3. See infra notes 189-90, 233, 238, 318-31 and accompanying text.
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a comprehensive bibliography, see Houdek, Con-
stitutional Limitations on Libel Actions: A Bibliography of New York Times and Its
Progeny, 6 Comm/ENr. L.J. 447 (1984).
5. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
6. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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by penance, and political libel was viewed by the infamous seventeenth cen-
tury Star Chamber as a crime of sedition against the Crown.7 In the centuries
of development in England and the United States, the essence of the defa-
mation action became clear, despite the illogical rules and distinctions that
came to surround it. Basic to the action is the falsity of a statement made
by the defendant about the plaintiff which results in harm to the plaintiff's
reputation.8 No matter how detrimental to reputation, no matter how hu-
miliated and embarrassed a person may be as a result of statements made
about him, no matter what damage one suffers from the communication,
the law of defamation will allow no recovery if the statement made is true. 9
Falsity remains at the very heart of the defamation action. While in most
areas of tort law the burden is on the plaintiff to prove some fault on the
defendant's part, the common law of defamation imposed strict liability upon
the defendant for the harm to the plaintiff's reputation caused by the false
statement. Despite a brief period in the seventeenth century when plaintiffs
were required to plead and prove both the defendants' intent to defame and
"malice," in terms of spite, hatred, ill will or motivation to harm,10 strict
liability remained the standard applicable to defamation actions. The neces-
sity of proving common law malice was rendered a legal fiction by the 1825
case of Bromage v. Prosser,' which held that what was required was "malice
in law," i.e., if a statement was false, defamatory, and intentional, "the law
implies such malice as is necessary to maintain the action."'' 2 The cases that
followed Bromage for almost a hundred years retained the strict liability
standard in the ordinary defamation action. 3
7. For the historical development of the law of defamation, see Carr, The
English Law of Defamation, 18 L.Q. REv. 255 (1902); Holdsworth, Defamation in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q. REv. 302, 397 (1924), 41 L.Q. REv. 13(1925); Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLuM. L. REv.
546 (1903), 4 CoLumr. L. REv. 33 (1904).
8. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEnTON ON
TORTS § 116, at 839 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & K=ON].
9. Id. § 116 at 840-42; see also Harnett & Thorton, The Truth Hurts: A Critique
of a Defense to Defamation, 35 VA. L. REv. 425 (1949); Ray, Truth: A Defense to
Libel, 16 MnN. L. REv. 43 (1932). Of course, a plaintiff injured by a true communication
about him may, under certain circumstances, recover damages by an action for invasion
of privacy. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
10. For a discussion of the development of the necessity to prove malice from
the treatment of slander as an "intentional" sin and political libel as an "intentional"
crime, see Veeder, supra note 7, at 35-36.
11. 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1825).
12. Id. at 1053.
13. See, e.g., Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Givens, 67 F.2d 62 (10th Cir. 1933)(innocent publication of an Associated Press report); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
228 N.Y. 58, 121 N.E. 260 (1920) (novel featured a fictitious character identifiable as a
city magistrate); Jones v. E. Hulton & Co., 2 K.B. 444 (1909), aff'd, A.C. 20 (H.L.)(1910) (defendant newspaper published a story about a fictitious person only to have
someone with the same name come forward claiming harm to reputation).
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Inevitably the first amendment guarantee of a free press and the strict
liability standard applied by the courts would come into conflict. The tension
intensified in the late nineteenth century when first amendment rights were
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. How could the
media freely discuss and comment on public issues and the conduct of public
officials with the threat of lawsuits for publication of false statements through
innocent mistake? At the same time, the individual, be he public official or
private person, had reputational rights which demanded protection. Freedom
of the press clearly did not imply freedom to ruin the reputation of the
innocent.
There gradually emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies two different ways of addressing the tension and attempting to resolve
the issue. The majority of the states came to adopt the rationale of the 1893
case of Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 4 involving a newspaper report of
alleged corruption in the selection of a candidate for a congressional seat in
Kentucky. Circuit Judge William Howard Taft wrote what would become
the hallmark opinion of the majority position. The lower court had charged
the jury that the article in question was "conditionally privileged." The public
acts of public men could, in good faith, be commented upon and criticized,
but false allegations of fact, i.e., that the candidate had committed "dis-
graceful acts," were not privileged." On appeal the defendant argued that
"the privilege extends to statements of fact as well as comment," 1 6 but the
Sixth Circuit rejected the theory that underlying untrue statements made in
good faith are privileged. Instead they adopted the traditional English rule
that statements of fact had to be proved true, leaving the privilege to be
applied only to fair comment and criticism. 7
The Hallam court reasoned that any privilege must fall where harm to
the individual went beyond societal benefits:
The existence and extent of privilege in communications are determined by
balancing the needs and goods of society against the right of an individual
to enjoy a good reputation when he has done nothing which ought to injure
it. The privilege should always cease where the sacrifice of the individual
right becomes so great that the public good to be derived from it is out-
weighed.,,
The decision centered on the falsity of the charges published and the essence
of the defamation action, not the intent of the publisher. In balancing a
14. 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893).
15. See Hallam v. Post Publishing Co., 55 F. 456, 461 (S.D. Ohio 1893).
16. Hallam, 59 F. at 540.
17. Id. at 541 (relying on Davis v. Shepstone, 11 App. Cas. 187, and Burt v.
Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238 (1891)) (Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes adopted
the Davis rule).
18. Hallam, 59 F. at 540.
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public official's reputational rights against the freedom of the press, the
ruling refused to recognize that the press would be hampered by liability for
published false statements that were believed to be true,19 and recognized the
dangers that "honorable and worthy men may be driven from politics and
public service by allowing too great latitude in attacks upon their charac-
ters." 20 Nevertheless, Hallam, holding that the qualified or conditional priv-
ilege extended only to comment and criticism based on true facts and no
further, came, to be the rule of defamation law in a majority of the states.2
In contrast, a minority of the states concentrated on the issue of malice,
or its absence, on the part of the media defendant and in so doing adopted
the rule that the qualified privilege extended beyond comment and criticism
based on actual facts to misstatements of fact if made without malice. Courts
which adopted the more liberal view did not reject protection of a public
official's reputational rights, but rather stressed the public's right to full
discussion of ideas. The leading 1908 Kansas case, Coleman v. MacLennan, 2
became the most frequently cited decision by state courts which expanded
the privilege.23 The Topeka State Journal published an article about Attorney
19. Id. at 541 ("The freedom of the press is not in danger from the enforcement
of the rule we uphold.").
20. Id.
21. See Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913);
Murray v. Galbraith, 95 Ark. 199, 128 S.W. 1047 (1910); Metropolis Co. v. Croasdell,
145 Fla. 455, 199 So. 568 (1941); Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Inl. 405,
123 N.E. 587 (1919); Democrat Publishing Co. v. Harvey, 181 Ky. 730, 205 S.W. 908
(1918); Martin v. Markley, 202 La. 291, 11 So. 2d 593 (1943); Pattangall v. Mooers,
113 Me. 412, 94 A. 561 (1915); Bowie v. Evening News, 148 Md. 569, 129 A. 797
(1925); Commonwealth v. Pratt, 208 Mass. 553, 95 N.E. 105 (1911); Oakes v. State, 98
Miss. 80, 54 So. 79 (1910); Lindsey v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 20 N.J. Misc. 1275, 163
A. 245 (1932); Cohalan v. New York Tribune, 172 Misc. 20, 15 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1939);
Langer v. Courier-News, 46 N.D. 430, 179 N.W. 909 (1920); Peck v. Coos Bay Times
Publishing Co., 122 Ore. 408, 259 P. 307 (1927); Jackson v. Record Publishing Co.,
175 S.C. 211, 178 S.E. 833 (1935); State v. Colby, 98 Vt. 96, 126 A. 510 (1918); Carpenter
v. Meredith, 122 Va. 446, 96 S.E. 635 (1917); McKillip v. Grays Harbor Publishing Co.,
100 Wash. 657, 171 P. 1026 (1918); Lukaszewicz v. Dziadulewicz, 198 Wis. 605, 225
N.W. 172 (1929).
Several states adopted a less rigid rule than Hallam and extended the privilege to
false statements of fact about public officials, provided they were not false charges of
crimes, gross immorality or dishonesty. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Sweeney v. Caller-Times Publishing Co., 41 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Tex.
1941); Donahue v. Star Publishing Co., 58 A. 513 (Del. 1904); Cummins v. State, 89
Ind. App. 256, 166 N.E. 155 (1929); Holway v. World Publishing Co., 171 Okla. 306,
44 P.2d 881 (1935); Nicholson v. State, 24 Wyo. 347, 157 P. 1013 (1913).
22. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
23. While Coleman is perhaps the most noted decision espousing the liberal view,
it is by no means the first decision to extend the privilege to misstatements of fact made
in good faith. As early as 1868, in Palmer v. City of Concord, 97 Am. Dec. 605 (N.H.
1868), New Hampshire allowed a publisher who charged a Civil War Union army unit
1987]
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General Coleman, a candidate for reelection, and his official conduct in
connection with a school fund transaction. After a jury verdict for the
defendant, Coleman appealed on the basis of the trial court's instruction to
the jury:
[W]here an article is published and circulated among voters for the sole
purpose of giving what the defendant believes to be truthful information
concerning a candidate for public office and for the purpose of enabling
such voters to cast their ballot more intelligently, and the whole thing is
done in good faith and without malice, the article is privileged, although
the principal matters contained in the article may be untrue in fact and
derogatory to the character of the plaintiff; and in such a case the burden
is on the plaintiff to show actual malice in the publication of the article.24
The Kansas Supreme Court at the outset of its opinion affirming judgment
for the defendant acknowledged that its attention was centered beyond the
rights of the parties and the truth or falsity of the publication:
Beyond their importance to the immediate parties the questions raised are
of the utmost concern to all the people of the state. What are the limitations
for the right of a newspaper to discuss the official character and conduct
of a public official who is a candidate for reelection?5
with cowardice in battle, to avoid liability "if the facts he alleged were true, or if he
had probable cause to believe, and did believe, that they were true." Id. at 607.
Prior to Coleman, some courts confused "comment" on false facts with the false
facts themselves and thus extended the "privilege." Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235
(1877), concerned a newspaper's report and comments about a statue, supposedly Phoen-
ician in origin, but excavated in New York. The plaintiff owner claimed a $30,000 sale
was not completed following the false report that it had recently been sold in New
Orleans for eight dollars. The Massachusetts Supreme Court extended the privilege to
comment based on false facts, if made in good faith, by confusing "comment" with
the underlying "false facts" and identifying the "facts" with the "comments":
The editor of a newspaper has the right ... of publishing ... comments...
upon anything which is made by its owner a subject of public exhibition...
and such publication falls within the class of privileged communications for
which no action can be maintained without proof of actual malice .... Malice
in uttering false statements may consist either in a direct intention to injure
another, or in a reckless disregard of his rights and of the consequences that
may result to him.
Id. at 238-39. Thus, the privilege extended to the misrepresentation that the statue had
been sold for eight dollars.
Myers v. Longstaff, 14 S.D. 98, 84 N.W. 233 (1900), involved statements made
by a newspaper about a candidate running for mayor. The court held: "Under the
pleadings the alleged libelous publications were presumptively privileged, and in such a
case the burden of proving express malice on the part of the defendant is upon the
plaintiff, and he could not recover without proof of such malice." Id. at 108, 84 N.W.
at 236.
24. Coleman, 78 Kan. at 712, 98 P. at 281-82.
25. Id. at 715, 98 P. at 283.
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Unlike the Hallam court, the primary concern of the Coleman court was not
to resolve the dispute between plaintiff and defendant as equitably as pos-
sible, but rather to channel the private litigation before it into broad public
objectives. The court evaluated the warring interests of individual reputation
and free speech and determined to shift its attention from the essence of the
allegedly defamatory publication, i.e., its falsity, and instead to concentrate
on society's need for the free dissemination of information and comment so
that the public good might be advanced. The premise that an individual
should not suffer a loss of reputation for the public good was not viewed
as a statement but rather as a question to be decided. By its deference to
what it considered the "public good," the Coleman court dogmatically an-
swered the question simply: "Where the public welfare is concerned the
individual must frequently endure injury to his reputation without remedy.''26
In shifting its view away from the truth or falsity of the published
statement, the Coleman court did a distinct disservice to the defamed plaintiff
and clouded the distinction between falsity and fair comment: "Will the
liberty of the press be endangered if the discussion of. . . matters [of public
interest] must be confined to statements of demonstrable truth, and to what
a jury may . . . say is 'fair' criticism and comment?" 27 The Coleman court
misunderstood the rationale of Hallam as being solely based on the "pre-
diction" that honorable men would not enter politics should they have to
sacrifice their good names in the process. 2 Careful to defend its own ra-
tionale, the decision stated that its approach to resolving the tension between
the individual and the media was totally consistent with many prior decisions
in England and the United States29 and was a natural development from
dictum in an 1884 Kansas decision, State v. Balch.3 0 Balch was a criminal
26. Id. at 722, 98 P. at 285.
27. Id. at 735, 98 P. at 289 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 732, 98 P. at 288.
29. The law of libel was liberalized in England by the "Fox Libel Act." See 2
May's Const. Hist. of Eng. 122. The Coleman court reinforced its view of the im-
portance to society's welfare of a liberalized defamation law by citing the English case,
Wason v. Walker, 4 L.R.-Q.B. 73, 93 (1868):
Our view of libel has, in many respects, only gradually developed itself into
anything like a satisfactory and settled form. The full liberty of public writers
to comment on the conduct and motives of public men has only in recent times
been recognized. Comments on government, on ministers, and officers of state,
on members of both houses of parliament, on judges and other public func-
tionaries are now made every day, which half a century ago would have been
the subject of actions or ex officio informations, and would have brought down
fine and imprisonment on publishers and authors. Yet who can doubt that the
public are gainers by the change, and that, though injustice may often be done,
and though public men may often have to smart under the keen sense of wrong
inflicted by hostile criticism, the nation profits by public opinion being thus
freely brought to bear on the discharge of public duties?
Cited at 78 Kan. at 734, 98 P. at 289.
30. 31 Kan. 465, 2 P. 609 (1884).
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libel case involving circulation of a printed handbill implying that a candidate
for county attorney had been involved in voting fraud in a prior election, in
which the court said:
Generally, we think a person may in good faith publish whatever he may
honestly believe to be true .. .without committing any public offense,
although what he published may in fact not be true and may be injurious
to the character of others. 3'
The Coleman court passed over the fact that Balch was a criminal case3 2 and
had no regard for the plaintiff's difficult task to prove bad faith, i.e., malice,
on the part of the defendant-a problem that would claim the attention of
the United States Supreme Court for two decades after New York Times v.
Sullivan-with the observation: "Good faith and bad faith are as easily
proved in a libel case as in other branches of the law."' 33
A minority of the states3 4 adopted the Coleman rationale and afforded
protection to false statements about public officials so long as they were
published without malice and with probable cause to believe in the truth of
the statements. In so doing, the very basis for liability in defamation law
was questioned, for the public official plaintiff was now required to rebut a
new and powerful affirmative defense in any defamation action against a
media defendant. Previously, to establish a prima facie case of common law
defamation, the plaintiff had to prove publication to a third party of a
defamatory statement of or concerning him which altered his reputation and
then was required to prove whatever damages necessary under the law then
in effect. "Fault" was not at issue, so the plaintiff's task was a relatively
easy one. Over the years very few affirmative defenses were available to the
defendant: truth, the absolute privilege afforded to those engaged in judicial
or certain official proceedings, the privilege to publish accurate reports about
such proceedings, and the Hallam qualified or conditional privilege to crit-
icize and comment on true statements of fact. With the acceptance by a
31. Id. at 472, 2 P. at 614.
32. Coleman, 78 Kan. at 728, 98 P. at 287 ("True, that was a criminal case,
but the rule of privilege is the same in both civil and criminal actions.").
33. Id. at 742, 98 P. at 292.
34. See Conner v. Timothy, 43 Ariz. 517, 33 P.2d 293 (1934); Snively v. Record
Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1942); Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing
Co., 111 Colo. 492, 144 P.2d 981 (1943); Moynahan v. Waterbury Republican, 92 Conn.
331, 102 A. 653 (1918); Children v. Shinn, 168 Iowa 531, 150 N.W. 864 (1915); Poleski
v. Polish American Publishing Co., 254 Mich. 15, 235 N.W. 841 (1931); Friedell v.
Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974 (1925); Cooper v. Romney, 49
Mont. 119, 141 P. 289 (1914); Estelle v. Daily News Publishing Co., 99 Neb. 397, 156
N.W. 645 (1916); Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N.H. 67, 121 A. 92 (1923); Lewis v. Carr,
178 N.C. 578, 101 S.E. 97 (1919); Jackson v. Pittsburgh Times, 152 Pa. 406, 25 A. 613
(1893); Egan v. Dotsun, 36 S.D. 459, 155 N.W. 783 (1915); Williams v. Standard-
Examiners Publishing. Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933); Bailey v. Charleston Mail
Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1944).
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significant number of states of the Coleman extension of protection, a new
hurdle was raised in the way of the public official plaintiff in any defamation
action against a media defendant: to surmount the Coleman privilege raised
as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff had henceforth to prove the defend-
ant's "fault" or "malice" as the underlying basis of liability. Over fifty
years would pass before the United States Supreme Court decided to attempt
to resolve the tension that continued to develop.
III. TBE New York Times RULE: PUBLIC OFICIALSAND
THE MEDIA DEFENDANT
On March 9, 1964, the United States Supreme Court decided New York
Times v. Sullivan and thereby rejected the majority rule that the protection
afforded the press was restricted to comment and did not extend to mis-
statement of fact. In reversing the Alabama Supreme Court's affirmation of
a $500,000 jury verdict against the New York Times for printing an adver-
tisement placed by a civil rights group supporting Dr. Martin Luther King
which contained misstatements about the actions taken by Montgomery po-
lice, and implicitly by the supervising commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, 35 the
Court not only held that the Alabama rule of libel law did not protect rights
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments36 but formulated a new
defamation law for the nation:
Constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual
malice" - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not. 37
35. Sullivan v. New York Times Co., 273 Ala. 656 (1962), rev'd, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. New York Times v. Sullivan was the first case in which the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a state judgment in a civil defamation action.
The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from abridging the privileges or immunities
of citizens without due process of law, and New York Times was not a state criminal
prosecution. The New York Times court circumvented this problem, stating:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts
have applied a state rule of law which ... imposes invalid restrictions on
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that law has been
applied in civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented
by statute.... The test is not the form in which state power has been applied
but ... whether such power has in fact been exercised.
376 U.S. at 265. Thus, New York Times in essence held that any state judge applying
state law in a civil defamation action was exercising state power which could be used
to abridge constitutional rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, and henceforth
any civil defamation action against a media defendant could be reviewed by the Supreme
Court because of the constitutional dimension.
37. Id. at 279-80.
1987]
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
Furthermore, to prevail in a libel action, the public official must prove the
actual malice with "convincing clarity,"38 a term which was left undefined.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brennan relied strongly on, and
quoted extensively from, the Coleman decision 39 and adopted its rationale
by ignoring concentration on the truth or falsity of the publication and
focusing on the status of the plaintiff and the constitutional protection given
the media defendant. "If neither factual error nor defamatory content suf-
fices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct,
the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate." 4 Thus, the issue
of falsity was obfuscated by the requirement that the plaintiff first prove
that the publisher knew the publication was false or that it proceeded with
reckless disregard of truth or falsity. How could a public official surmount
this hurdle? The New York Times Court was silent.
Preoccupied with its emphasis on the public's right to know at the
expense of the plaintiff's good name, the decision rested on the necessity of
avoiding "self-censorship ... by would-be critics of official conduct [who]
may be deterred from voicing this criticism, even though it is believed to be
true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do S0, ' ' 41 and on "the
background of profound national commitment to the principal that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... -42 Im-
portant as these considerations are, the question remained: how may an
aggrieved public official proceed to vindicate his reputation? There were two
concurring opinions by Justices Goldberg and Black, in both of which Justice
Douglas joined: Justice Goldberg thought the majority opinion should have
acknowledged "an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official con-
duct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses";43 Justice
Black viewed the Court's definition of "malice" as "an elusive, abstract
concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove," 44 and favored "granting the
press an absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their
public duty. ' 45 Commissioner Sullivan had resorted to legal action to restore
38. Id. at 285-86.
39. Id. at 280-82.
40. Id. at 273.
41. Id. at 279. Undoubtedly the Court considered the deterring effect on
defendants of litigation expenses and the possibility of excessive verdicts. The Alabama
Supreme Court had affirmed the $500,000 judgment against the Times and another
$500,000 verdict had been awarded against the Times to another commissioner. Id. at
294.
42. Id. at 270.
43. Id. at 298 (Goldberg and Stevens, J.J., concurring).
44. Id. at 293 (Black and Douglas, J.J., concurring).
45. Id. at 295 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the majority opinion




his reputation, yet the Supreme Court's decision did not address the essential
element of his libel action, the falsity of the publication, and avoided it
altogether by basing its holding squarely on the first amendment free speech
aid free press guarantees.
A few months after New York Times, the United States Supreme Court
in Garrison v. Louisiana46 clarified the phrase of the New York Times rule
"with reckless disregard of whether it [the statement] was false or not'"47 by
holding that the rule was satisfied if a public official plaintiff could prove
that the publication was made with a "high degree of awareness of . . .
probable falsity.'"'4 Decided solely on first amendment grounds, the Court
seemed unconcerned that the private reputations of public officials may be
adversely affected by a false statement: "[W]here the criticism is of public
officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private repu-
tation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution,
in the dissemination of truth.' 49 "The New York Times rule is not rendered
inapplicable merely because an official's private reputation, as well as his
public reputation, is harmed."' 50 The explanation of what may be proved to
establish "reckless disregard" did not inform the public official plaintiff of
how to prove it. Once again, the Court turned a blind eye to the heart of a
defamation action.
In 1968, the Supreme Court raised the hurdle it had erected in the public
official's path to an insurmountable height. After St. Amant v. Thompson,"
New York Times malice became more difficult to prove when the Court
offered' "meaningful guidance" to the defamed public official plaintiff who
thereafter could recover if he could prove that "the defendant in fact en-
tertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with
such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates
actual malice." ' 52 The St. Amant Court was well aware that such a test might
permit the issue to be determined solely by the defendant's testimony that
the statement was published in good faith and that the reckless disregard
46. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The decision reversed a criminal libel conviction of the
New Orleans District Attorney who, in the course of a press conference, had accused
eight criminal court judges of, among other things, inefficiency, laziness, and taking
excessive vacations.
47. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
48. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74.
49. Id. at 72-73.
50. Id. at 77.
51. 390 U.S. 727 (1968). A candidate for the United States Senate while on
television read into the cameras an affidavit by a union official that the plaintiff deputy
sheriff had taken bribes. The defendant candidate had not checked the facts and had
not inquired into the reputation of the union official. The state court held that the lack
of further investigation by the defendant candidate constituted "reckless disregard for
the truth." 250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967), rev'd, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
52. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
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standard might permit recovery in fewer situations than might be the case if
the standard to be applied was that of the prudent publisher or the reasonable
person.5 3 The Court's attempt to give "meaningful guidance" led the public
official plaintiff straight into a barrier which would block his attempts to
restore his reputation.
Many of the difficulties raised by the New York Times holding which
would occupy the Court's attention up until the present time may well have
been avoided if more attention had been given to Justice Black's absolutist
interpretation of the first amendment guarantees, for in his concurring opin-
ion he viewed the Court's adoption of the malice standard as a stop-gap
measure and believed the Constitution granted the press an absolute immunity
to criticize public officials.14 If the constitutional protection offered the press
had been considered an "immunity" rather than a "privilege," alternative
remedies other than money damages may have become available to a defamed
plaintiff.
As shall be proposed," viewing the protection as an "immunity" rather
than a "privilege" recasts a defamation action against a media defendant.
An immunity differs from a privilege in that a privilege is an affirmative
defense raised by the defendant as an excuse or justification for his otherwise
tortious conduct and affects the very basis of liability. 56 A privileged action
avoids all liability where it would otherwise follow, 57 so that the underlying
act is non-tortious and no cause of action exists. The intentional torts are
defined as unpermitted and unprivileged invasions of particular rights. Thus,
a drowning swimmer who crawls onto another's land without the other's
permission in order to save himself has acted under privilege. No tort has
been committed; no cause of action and no basis of liability exists although
procedurally the privilege is raised as a defense.58 If after inquiry it is estab-
lished that the defendant acted in good faith because his own interests re-
quired it or because the interests of society demanded it, protection is granted
as a matter of law and the plaintiff's action must be dismissed.
An immunity, on the other hand, exists when the actor, because of his
status or position, is protected from civil liability, i.e., money damages,
53. Id.
54. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 279-88 and accompanying text.
56. Booth & Brother v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 188, 65 A. 226, 229 (1906)
("There is no justification for a tort. The so-called justification is an exceptional fact
which shows that no tort was committed.").
57. See PROSSER AND KumaoN, supra note 8, at 108-09 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 10 (1965)).
58. If in the process of saving his life the swimmer damages the property, he is
liable to make restitution for the damage caused - not as a damage resulting from a
trespass but rather as the consequence of a privileged act. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake
Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
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within the limits of the immunity. The actor's conduct remains tortious, but
the resulting civil liability is avoided. Unlike a privileged act, alternate rem-
edies may be available to a plaintiff damaged by the conduct of an actor
claiming an immunity. 9 In the years following New York Times the Supreme
Court had many opportunities to address this distinction yet refrained from
doing so in its preoccupation with defining the plaintiff's status in terms of
malice.
IV. TiE PUBLIC FIGURE PLAINTIFF: Gertz v. Robert Welch
How far and in what ways the New York Times rule would be extended
or clarified occupied the United States Supreme Court for a decade. With
its attention riveted on the status of the plaintiff in defamation actions against
media defendants, the Court struggled to define "status" in terms of New
York Times malice and ignored the plaintiff's chief interest in each case, viz.
the restoration and vindication of his reputation. In its decisions no effort
was made to consider the availability of alternate procedures, other than a
suit for money damages, by which the plaintiff's burden could be lessened.
The New York Times Court had not defined the classification "public
official," ' ° and less than two years after its decision, the Court had an
opportunity to draw precise lines but declined to do so. In Rosenblatt v.
Baer61 the plaintiff supervisor of a public recreational area sued the defendant
newspaper columnist who had written that the recreational center was in a
better financial position a year after the plaintiff's dismissal, thus implying
that the plaintiff was inefficient or dishonest. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded on the basis of erroneous jury instructions but also considered
the question of whether the supervisor was a "public official" within the
New York Times holding and thus held to the New York Times malice
standard. The Court rejected the argument that the question of who was a
"public official" should be answered by reference to state law standards 62
and declined to establish a uniform standard,63 but remarked that since New
York Times was decided to assure uninhibited debate on public issues,
It is clear . . . that the public official designation applies at the very least
to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear
59. See generally PRossER & KEETON, supra note 8, at 1032-75.
60. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23 ("We have no occasion here to
determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public
official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule, or otherwise to specify
categories of persons who would or would not be included.").
61. 383 U.S. 75 (1966). After a jury award of $31,500 for the plaintiff, but
before affirmation by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, 106 N.H. 26, 203 A.2d 773
(1964), New York Times was decided. The New Hampshire court found the decision no
bar to its affirmation of the award.
62. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 84.
63. Id. at 85 ("No precise lines need be drawn for the purpose of this case.").
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to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the con-
duct of governmental affairs.61
The following year, the Supreme Court decided two cases simultaneously,
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker. 65 In Butts,
the plaintiff football coach on the University of Georgia staff, but whose
salary was paid by a private alumni group, sued the Saturday Evening Post
because of an article that accused him of divulging his team's game plans
to the University of Alabama coach before the 1962 Alabama-Georgia game.
In Walker, the plaintiff political activist, a former Army general, was said
to have personally led an assault against federal marshals who were on the
University of Mississippi campus in 1962 to enforce a desegregation order.
The cases were decided together precisely so that the Supreme Court could
once again concentrate on the status of the plaintiffs in order to decide
whether the New York Times malice standard was applicable.6 6 The under-
lying facts and the method of reporting were decidedly different. In Butts,
there was no deadline to meet, yet no efforts were made to check the story,
which was based on the hotly disputed content of an overheard phone con-
versation between the two coaches, and which misrepresented the game itself
and the players' subsequent remarks about the game. In Walker, the Asso-
ciated Press received the "hot news" story from a reliable correspondent on
the scene and only some facts as to the actual role played by Walker in the
course of the campus riot were disputed. Butts' judgment for $460,000 was
affirmed by a vote of 5 to 4, and Walker's judgment was unanimously
reversed. What is quite notable is the effect of the split Court's holding on
subsequent defamation law. Neither state court had applied the New York
Times standard because Butts and Walker were not "public officials," but
the Supreme Court wanted to decide what standard was to be applied to
plaintiffs of the status of Butts and Walker. Both were considered "public
figures; Butts by his position alone, Walker by "thrusting ... his person-
ality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy. '" 6 7 The justices
differed on the standard to be applied. Justice Harlan, writing the opinion
of the Court in which Justices Clark, Stuart and Fortas joined, reached his
decision upholding Butts' judgment based on a standard different from New
York Times malice, viz., a public figure plaintiff may prevail in an action
against a media defendant upon "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
64. Id. It should be noted that the Court remarked that "it is for the trial judge
in the first instance to determine whether the proofs show [the plaintiff] to be a 'public
official."' Id. at 88.
65. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
66. Id. at 134 ("We brought these two cases here to consider the impact of
[New York Times] on libel actions instituted by persons who are not public officials,
but who are 'public figures' and involved in issues in which the public has a justified
and important interest.") (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 155.
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constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. '68 Chief Justice
Warren concurred in affirming Butts' judgment but thought the New York
Times standard should apply to "public figures." 69 In a dissenting opinion,
Justices Brennan and White agreed with the Chief Justice, and Justices Black
and Douglas, while advocating press and speech freedoms far wider than
those granted by New York Times, nevertheless joined with the Chief Justice
on the applicability of the New York Times standard that the Court might
reach a decision. The result was that the concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Warren became the law of the land and the New York Times standard was
extended to public figure plaintiffs based on the reasoning that the "views
and actions [of public figures] with respect to public issues and events are
often of as much concern to the citizen as the attitudes and behavior of
'public officials' with respect to the same issue and events." ' 70
In extending the New York Times standard the Butts Court gave scant
attention to the defamed plaintiff's exceedingly slim chance of success in an
action where New York Times malice must be proved except in the most
blatant cases of grossly irresponsible reporting like that in the Butts action.71
And, just as the Court failed to precisely define "public official" in Rosen-
blatt, so too the term "public figure" was inadequately dealt with.
The "seminal ' 72 decision in New York Times had not considered the
standard to be applied in a defamation action against a media defendant by
a "private person" involved in a matter of public concern. This next step
in the extension of constitutional protection of the media was taken in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,71 which involved allegedly defamatory
broadcasts charging that a distributor of nudist magazines was a "smut
distributor" and "girlie-book peddler." 74 Before his involvement in the con-
troversy, Rosenbloom was certainly not a public figure, but rather "just one
of the millions of Americans who live their lives in obscurity. ' 75 The Third
Circuit reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the grounds that the
68. Id.
69. Id. at 164.
70. Id. at 162.
71. It should be noted that New York Times protection was extended to news-
papers accurately reporting charges against public officials, Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), and the accurate reporting of an apparent meaning
of a Civil Rights Commission report, although the word "alleged" was omitted, Time,
Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
72. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and The First Amendment: Hill, Butts
and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 305.
73. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
74. Id. at 36. Rosenbloom was acquitted of criminal obscenity charges under
the trial judge's instructions that the nudist magazines were not obscene as a matter of
law. Id.
75. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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broadcasts concerned matters of public interest and, despite the fact that the
plaintiff was a private individual, "the first amendment standard of actual
malice is applicable. ' 76 The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a
plurality opinion, holding that constitutional free press guarantees should be
extended to "all discussion and communication involving matters of public
or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are fa-
mous or anonymous. '77
Since there was no majority opinion in Rosenbloom, the holding had
limited effect on subsequent defamation actions against media defendants,
but it stood firmly in the progression of cases in which the Court's attention
was myopically focussed on the rights of the media. Justice Brennan made
only a passing acknowledgment of the plaintiff's plight in his efforts to
restore his reputation:
If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately
to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring
their ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters
of public concern.7'
Subsequent developments in defamation law have shown that possible alter-
native remedies implied by Justice Brennan, viz. retraction status, right-of-
reply statutes, or guarantees of right of access to the media,79 would all face
constitutional difficulties.
In Rosenbloom, the seed of New York Times had grown into a veritable
protective thicket surrounding the media. Although the phrase "matter of
public interest" was left undefined, what purpose is there for the media to
publish something that is of no interest to the public? Again, in Rosenbloom,
Justice Black reiterated his belief that the media should be afforded complete
constitutional protection, the absolute immunity he espoused in New York
Times,80 but did not offer any alternative remedy to the defamed plaintiff.
It was not until 1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,8" that the expansion
of the New York Times rule came to an unsteady halt. The plaintiff, an
76. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1969), aff'd,
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
77. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion
in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Black concurred on
the basis of his concurring opinion in New York Times. Id. at 57. Justice White
concurred on a decidedly different ground, i.e., "The First Amendment gives the press
and the broadcast media a privilege to report and comment upon the official actions of
public servants in full detail, with no requirement that the reputation or the privacy of
an individual involved in or affected by the official action be spared from public view."
Id. at 62.
78. Id. at 47.
79. Id. at 47 n.15.
80. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring).
81. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Even though a majority of the Rosenbloom Court had
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attorney who represented the family of the deceased in a civil action against
a Chicago policeman convicted of murdering the young man, brought suit
against the defendant publisher who had depicted the plaintiff as a "Len-
inist," "communist-fronter," a member of a number of various Communist
organizations, and an architect of the "frame-up" of the convicted police-
man. The Seventh Circuit 82 on the basis of the Rosenbloom holding affirmed
the District Court's judgment n.o.v. for the defendant.83 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, remanded, and set forth new constitutional limi-
tations on defamation actions by "private persons" against media defend-
ants, specifically rejecting the Rosenbloom plurality's rule in holding that a
media defendant may not claim the protection of the New York Times rule
when it publishes defamatory material about a private person, even though
the publication concerned a matter of public interest. 84
In Gertz, the Supreme Court continued its ten year history of recasting
defamation law in terms of the plaintiff's status in society but did attempt
to bring some relief to the defamed private person by indicating that a
standard different from the New York Times rule may be made available to
him. In balancing the necessity for an uninhibited, free press against the
legitimate state interest 5 in allowing the possibility of a less rigorous standard
not supported the application of the New York Times standard to all plaintiffs in
defamation actions against media defendants when the published matter was "of public
concern," many states and several circuits adopted the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom.
See, e.g., West v. Northern Publishing Co., 487 P.2d 1304 (Alaska 1971); Gallman v.
Caines, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973); Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal.
App. 3d 384, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1972); Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 294 A.2d
326 (1972); Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972); State v. Snyder, 277
So. 2d 660 (La. 1972); Priestley v. Hastings & Sons Publishing Co., 360 Mass. 118, 271
N.E.2d 628 (1971); Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 264 Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972);
Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 291 Minn. 468, 193 N.W.2d 139 (1971); Whitmore
v. Kansas City Star Co., 499 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Trails West, Inc. v.
Wolff, 32 N.Y.2d 207, 298 N.E.2d 52, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1973); Washington v. World
Publishing Co., 506 P.2d 913 (Okla. 1972); Sanders v. Harris, 213 Va. 369, 192 S.E.2d
754 (1972); Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 37, 515 P.2d 154 (1973); Polzin
v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972); see also Davis v. National
Broadcasting Co., 447 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1971); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986
(8th Cir. 1972); Porter v. Guam Publications, Inc., 475 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973). The
Third Circuit, however, noted its "discomfort in accepting the Rosenbloom plurality
opinion as a definitive statement of the appropriate law .... " Gordon v. Random
House, Inc., 486 F.2d 1356, 1359 (3d Cir. 1973).
82. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1973).
83. Id. at 808.
84. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 346-47.
85. Id. at 349 ("[H]ere we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing
interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment."); see also
Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel
Law and the First Amendment, 26 HAsTINGs L.J. 777 (1975) (tracing the development
of defamation from New York Times, noting that the Gertz decision signifies a shift
1987]
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
to be applied in suits by private persons damaged by defamatory statements,
the Court reasoned that the private person does not have easy access to the
media to rebut defamatory statements, has not sought involvement in public
affairs, has not thrust himself into the forefront of public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of issues, and thus left to the states the
right to adopt for themselves different tests of liability for media defamation
of private individuals. 6 However, liability without fault could not be im-
posed, punitive or presumed damages could not be awarded unless New York
Times malice was proven, and in the absence of a showing of New York
Times malice, private person plaintiffs could only recover "actual dam-
ages." '87 "Actual damages" were not restricted to the traditional dollar and
cent loss capable of proof, but included "impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering.""
Gertz did not abrogate New York Times protection to "public figures"
but reclassified such persons into "all-purpose public figures" and "limited-
purpose public figures" who are related to particular public controversies.89
away from concern with the first amendment and towards concern with state interest in
defamation).
86. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46.
87. Id. at 347-49.
88. Id. it 350.
89. Id. at 345:
[I]t may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no pur-
poseful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures
must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this status have
assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public
figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite
attention and comment.
Id. Gertz, in effect, complicated matters by this language.
Several post-Gertz decisions, Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979), should be viewed as clarifications of the public figure/private person distinction.
In Firestone, writing for a Court split 5 to 3, Justice Rehnquist stated that involvement
in a sensational divorce case does not render a private person a public figure for purposes
of defamation actions. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454. Voluntary use of the courts to obtain
legal dissolution of a marriage does not equal seeking publicity or influencing the outcome
of a private controversy. Id. at 453.
As the decade of clarification of the New York Times rule closed, Gertz emerged
as what seemed at the time a definitive halt in the expansion of constitutional protection.
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the Court considered whether a research scientist receiving
federal grants for animal research studies was a "limited" public figure because of his
involvement in a "controversy" after Senator Proxmire had conferred his "Golden Fleece
Award" on the scientist. In the course of his senate speech which was repeated in an
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The Court in fact continued to analyze the means available to plaintiffs to
restore their reputations in terms of their status, viz. self-help by access to
the media to deny the defamatory publication, but ignored the fact that a
denial in and of itself does not vindicate reputation, may entail the expend-
iture of large sums of money, and actually results in a republication of the
defamatory language. 90
In a thirty-five page dissent, Justice White alone among the Gertz Court
addressed the real problems faced by the private person plaintiff:
[W]ith the additional burden on the plaintiff of proving negligence or other
fault, it will be exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible, for him to vindicate
his reputation by securing a judgment for nominal damages, the practical
interview and a newsletter, Senator Proxmire referred to the plaintiff as one who was
wasting government funds. Actually, Dr. Hutchinson's experiments contributed valuable
information to the space program. The Court rejected the district court's determination,
431 F. Supp. 1311 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), that Dr.
Hutchinson was a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his use of the
federal grants after having been brought into the controversy by the Senator's allegations.
Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134-35.
Hutchinson did not thrust himself or his views into public controversy to
influence others .... Moreover, Hutchinson at no time assumed any role of
public prominence in the broad question of concern about expenditures. Neither
his applications for federal grants nor his publications in professional journals
can be said to have invited that degree of public attention and comment on
his receipt of federal grants essential to meet the public figure level.
Id. at 135.
In Wolston, the defendant published the plaintiffs name on a list of "Soviet
agents" identified in the United States. Wolston was a nephew of convicted Soviet spies,
who had in fact failed to appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet agents in the
United States. The lower courts held he was a public figure and granted summaryjudgment because as a matter of law he could not prove New York Times malice. The
United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found
that Wolston had not "voluntarily thrust" or injected himself into a public controversy,
but rather he had been "dragged unwillingly" into the investigation. 443 U.S. at 166.
The Court also noted that a public controversy must be a true "controversy," and "there
was no public controversy or debate in 1958 about the desirability of permitting Soviet
espionage in the United States; all responsible United States citizens understandably were
and are opposed to it." Id. at 166 n.8; see also Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 658, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, - (1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Rancho La Costa, 450 U.S. 902 (1980).
90. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help - using available
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize
its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures usually
enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication
and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than
private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vul-





effect of such a judgment being a judicial declaration that the publication
was indeed false. Under the new rule the plaintiff can lose, not because the
statement is true, but because it was not negligently made. 9'
The majority opinion and the concurring and other dissenting opinions gave
no attention to Justice White's assessment of the monumental task the Su-
preme Court imposed upon a media-defamed plaintiff and ignored his plea
for an alternative remedy: "I have said before, but it bears repeating, that
even if the plaintiff should recover no monetary damages, he should be able
to prevail and have a judgment that the publication is false." 92
V. DEVELOPMENTS A=R Gertz
In Gertz the states were left "to define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability" 93 and were allowed "to impose liability on the pub-
lishers . . . of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing than that
required by New York Times' 9 4 in defamation actions by private persons
against media defendants. Initially, Gertz appears to have halted the exten-
sion of the application of the New York Times rule, but it actually extended
a modified New York Times rule in that the private person plaintiff was
henceforth required to prove New York Times malice to recover punitive
damages and, in the absence of New York Times malice, could recover only
"actual" and not general damages. Gertz left open more questions than it
answered,95 and in the years that have followed, few if any of those questions
have been answered by the Supreme Court.
A. Forum-Shopping
The states have not uniformly adopted the negligence standard allowed
by Gertz in cases involving private person plaintiffs, 96 and, as a result of
91. Id. at 376 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 393 (White, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 347.
94. Id. at 348.
95. Numerous articles have attempted to answer some of the issues left open by
Gertz. See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. Rv. 422 (1975)
(self-censorship still remains a problem after Gertz, with more protection needed). This
contrasts with the view expressed in Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment:
In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. Rav. 199 (1976) (Gertz lauded as
bringing a measure of clarity and stability to defamation, particularly on the state level
where negligence provides an easier standard to handle than a constitutional privilege).
See also Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. Rnv.
1205 (1976) (taking issue with the Court's focus on public character when the Court
should actually be considering the person and the subject matter in its analysis);
McCarthy, How State Courts Have Responded to Gertz in Setting Standards of Fault,
1979 JOUR. Q. 531.
96. Most states chose and continue to follow a negligence standard in such cases.
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Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,97 this has led to the possibility of state-to-state
forum shopping by plaintiffs in defamation actions. 98 In Keeton v. Hustler
See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. R.D. Hicks, 448 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1979); Antwerp Diamond
Exch. of Am. v. Better Business Bureau of Maricopa County, 130 Ariz. 523, 637 P.2d
733 (1981); KARK-TV v. Simon, 280 Ark. 228, 656 S.W.2d 702 (1983); Gannett Co.
v. Re, 496 A.2d 553 (Del. 1985); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78
(D.C. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981); Mid-Florida Television Corp. v. Boyles,
467 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1985); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 317
S.E.2d 534 (1984); Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, 65 Haw. 584, 656 P.2d 79 (1982);
Troman v. Wood, 62 111. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1976); Gobin v. Globe Publishing
Co., 232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times
Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Wattigny v. Lambert,
408 So. 2d 1126 (La. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); Metromedia,
Inc. v. Hillman, 285 Md. 161, 400 A.2d 1117 (1979); New England Tractor-Trailer
Training of Connecticut v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471, 480 N.E.2d 1005
(1985); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 421 Mich. 125, 364 N.W.2d 600 (1984);
Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1985); Whitten v.
Commercial Dispatch Publishing Co., 487 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1986); Madison v. Yunker,
180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978); Duchesnaye v. Munro Enters., Inc., 125 N.H. 244,
480 A.2d 123 (1984); Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982); Embers
Supper Club, Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 9 Ohio St. 3d 22, 457 N.E.2d 1164
(1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d
85 (Okla. 1976); Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, Inc., 298 Or. 434, 693 P.2d 35,
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 84 (1985); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 506 Pa. 304, 485
A.2d 374 (1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986); Deloach v. Beaufort Gazette, 281 S.C.
474, 316 S.E.2d 139, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981 (1984); Memphis Publishing Co. v.
Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d
809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d
968 (Utah 1981); Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461
A.2d 414 (1983), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Great Coastal Express,
Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 334 S.E.2d 846 (1985); Dunlap v. Wayne, 105 Wash. 2d
529, 716 P.2d 842 (1986); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va.
1983); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
883 (1982); Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976).
Some states require more than the negligence standard in cases involving a private
plaintiff and a media defendant. See, e.g., Gay v. Williams, 484 F. Supp. 12 (D. Alaska
1979) (New York Times malice based on pre-Gertz Alaska state court decisions); Di-
versified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982) (reckless
disregard); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162
Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) (New York
Times malice); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 421 Mich. 125, 364 N.W.2d 600
(1984) (New York Times malice); Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 516 A.2d 1083
(1986) (private person with sufficient experience and knowledge entering in a personal
transaction or conducting his personal affairs in a manner that one in his position would
reasonably expect implicates a legitimate public interest held to New York Times malice
standard); Gaeta v. New York News, 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802 (1984) (gross
irresponsibility).
97. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
98. See Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or
a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FoRDnHAi L. REv. 167 (1985). "[A]s notions
of personal jurisdiction expand, it is often a state-to-state choice with the plaintiff seeking
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Magazine, Inc.,99 the non-resident plaintiff brought a libel action against the
defendant publisher in New Hampshire, where it sold between 10,000 and
15,000 magazines monthly, in order to take advantage of New Hampshire's
six-year statute of limitations in defamation actions.'0 In reversing and re-
manding the First Circuit's affirmation of the district court's dismissal, the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that it would be "unfair" for a federal
court in New Hampshire to assert jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant
publisher when a substantial number of copies of its national publication are
regularly sold and distributed.' 0' New Hampshire had adopted the negligence
standard to be applied in defamation actions by private persons. ' 2 It would
seem that, according to the Keeton rationale and the lack of uniformity
encouraged by Gertz, private person plaintiffs are free to search the fifty
states and to choose the law which is of most benefit. At first blush, this
may seem to give some relief to the plaintiff, but at what expense? How
many private individuals have the resources to pursue a suit, sometimes for
years, in what may be a jurisdiction far removed from their residence? And,
since the states remain free to change a standard once adopted, may not a
plaintiff who institutes suit at a time when a negligence standard is being
applied, find himself faced on appeal with a higher standard, e.g., New York
Times or Rosenbloom, if the state had adopted a different standard in the
interim?
B. Post-Gertz Decisions Add to the Confusion
In several post-Gertz decisions the United States Supreme Court and
various circuits sought to resolve some of the problems left open by New
York Times and its progeny. For the most part, due to the Court's continued
preoccupation with the standard to be applied according to the status of the
plaintiff, little if any help has been afforded to the plaintiff in his attempt
to surmount the hurdles erected by New York Times and St. Amant. When
faced with problems on the procedural level, the Court consistently avoided
the falsity of the defamatory publication and offered no real help to the
plaintiff in his attempts to vindicate his reputation.
To prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, insofar
as the media defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
to choose the most favorable procedural or substantive law or choice of law rules from
among the several different states that can exercise personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants." Id. at 179.
99. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
100. The statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's cause of action in every
other state. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd,
465 U.S. 770 (1984); see also Capra, Book Review: Conceptual Limitations on Long-
Arm Jurisdiction, 52 FoRDI-Am L. REv. 1034, 1044-51 (1984).
101. 465 U.S. at 781.
102. See McCusker v. Valley News, 121 N.H. 258, 428 A.2d 493, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1017 (1981).
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publication, 03 the plaintiff must be able to have access in pre-trial discovery
to the publisher's state of mind at the time of publication. After all, the
media defendant may testify in pre-trial affidavits or at trial as to his lack
of fault in the preparation of the allegedly defamatory material. In 1979,
the Supreme Court addressed the problem in Herbert v. Lando,' 4 in which
a 6 to 3 majority held that an allegedly defamed public figure plaintiff may
in pre-trial discovery inquire into the thought processes and editorial decisions
of a media defendant, for in order to prove New York Times malice such a
plaintiff must be able to "focus on the conduct and state of mind of the
defendant."' 05 In 1971, Colonel Anthony Herbert charged his superior of-
ficers with covering up war crimes in South Vietnam and further maintained
he had been relieved of his command because of those charges."' 6 CBS "60
Minutes" producer Barry Lando interviewed Herbert and researched his story,
and in a segment of the program, correspondent Mike Wallace narrated the
results of the investigation. In the discovery process, pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure0 7 which allow discovery of any unprivileged infor-
mation relevant to the subject matter of the action, Lando was deposed on
twenty-six occasions for over a year, 0 8 but he balked at answering questions
concerning his state of mind during the program's preparation.1"9 The district
court" granted an order compelling Lando to reply to the interrogations;
the Second Circuit reversed holding that the editorial process and a reporter's
state of mind were protected by the first amendment. The Supreme Court
reversed, refusing to recognize "a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct
inquiry into the editorial process, [for o]nly complete immunity from liability
for defamation would effect this result, and the Court has regularly found
this to be an untenable construction of the first amendment."'
The 1979 Herbert decision affected both plaintiff and media defendant,
but did nothing to lessen the time consumed by the litigation process" 2 and
103. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
104. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
105. Id. at 160. Note that in New York Times, Justice Goldberg thought that the
real issue was whether freedom of speech could be constitutionally protected by allowing
a "jury's evaluation of the speaker's state of mind." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 300.
In St. Amant, Justice White commented that by equating the defendant's truth with
"reckless disregard," the issue might be determined "by the defendant's testimony that
he published the statement in good faith and unaware of its probable falsity." 390 U.S.
at 731.
106. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S.
153 (1979).
107. FED. R. Cr. P. 26(b)(1).
108. Herbert, 568 F.2d at 981-82.
109. Id. at 982-83.
110. 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
111. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176.
112. Justice Marshall noted his concern that the majority opinion would allow
liberal discovery procedures to become tools for harassment and delay, presumably at
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the financial burdens imposed by drawn out procedures."' The decision's
effect on state "shield laws" which statutorily protect the secrecy of a re-
porter's informants is also uncertain."4
In 1984 the United States Supreme Court added yet another obstacle in
the path of a public figure plaintiff who has prevailed at trial level over a
media defendant: the possibility that the judgment will be reversed at the
appellate level following a "de novo" review of the evidence submitted. In
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,' Consumer Reports
published in 1970 a seven-page article evaluating the performance of medium-
priced loudspeakers, one of which was a Bose product. Bose objected to
numerous statements in the report on its product, especially that "individual
instruments ... tended to wander about the room. ' " 6 Prior to a bench trial,
the hands of plaintiffs who would try to force a settlement. Id. at 204. This view does
not take into account what the public figure plaintiff wants, i.e., a restored reputation,
not money damages.
A number of authors agree with the view of Justice Marshall that Herbert v. Lando
may have a chilling effect on the media and weakens the New York Times protection.
See Note, Constitutional Law - Self-Censorship After Herbert v. Lando: The Need for
Special Pre-Trial Procedure in Defamation Actions, 58 N.C.L. Rnv. 1025 (1980); Note,
Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Freedom of the Press - Erosion of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 13 AKRON L. REv. 373 (1979); Frakt, Defamation Since
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common Law, 10 RUTGERS L.J. 519 (1979);
see also Franklin, Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1035 (1979).
113. The Court noted that pre-trial discovery procedures may produce "mush-
rooming litigation costs" but recognized that this phenomenon was not peculiar to
defamation suits. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176.
114. Half of the states have enacted "shield laws," and in states without such
statutes, reporters have unsuccessfully attempted to claim a common law privilege. See
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (reporter
must testify as to identity of "source" when information sought goes to the "heart" of
plaintiff's claim); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (reporter must reveal sources
to a grand jury); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978), cert. denied sub nom.
New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (reporter held in civil and
criminal contempt for refusing to obey order to deliver certain documents to judge for
inspection in camera).
In defamation actions against media defendants, Herbert's effect is unclear, for in
Herbert the journalist's communications and thoughts were involved, not his sources of
information. "It is highly unlikely that any court will allow a person to sue a newspaper
for libel and then immediately learn all the confidential sources that were involved in
the creation of the story." T. CARTER, M. FRANricN & J. WRiGHT, Tim FIRsT AMEND-
mET AND TmE FouRTH ESTATE 405 (3d ed. 1985); see also CARTER, FRANKLiN & WIUGIRr,
supra at 377-411; Miller v. Transanerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, reh'g denied, 628
F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980) (New York Times, Branzburg and Herbert viewed as creating
a first amendment privilege, but when identity of informant is central to the plaintiffs
case and when plaintiff has already presented substantial evidence that the publication
complained of was factually untrue and defamatory, defendant must reveal source).
115. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
116. Id. at 488.
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the district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment" 7
and ruled that Bose was a public figure which had to prove New York Times
malice in order to recover damages. After a 19-day trial, in the course of
which the judge carefully considered the testimony and the demeanor at trial
of the engineer who supervised the testing of the Bose sound system, the
court held that the engineer knew that the words he used, "about the room,"
did not mean "along the wall" which would have accurately reflected the
facts,"' and that the plaintiff had sustained its burden of proving New York
Times malice on the part of the defendant.11 9
117. Id. at 489.
118. Id. at 490.
119. Id. at 491. The problem of differentiating fact from opinion will not be
addressed. At common law, the "fair comment doctrine" gave a qualified privilege to
those who published opinions about public interest subjects. The following elements had
to be proved to raise it as a defense: (1) the criticism was of legitimate public interest,
(2) it was based on facts that were stated or known to the reader, (3) the criticism was
an actual opinion and (4) the criticism was not made solely to injure the subject criticized.
See, e.g., Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Neglected Fair Comment Defense:
An Alternative to "Actual Malice," 30 DE PAUL L. Rnv. 1, 13 (1980).
Gertz may have fundamentally changed the "fair comment doctrine" by conferring
an absolute immunity from defamation actions for all opinions, for in dicta, the Gertz
Court stated:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the inten-
tional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open debate on the public issues.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270).
The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977), sought to clarify Gertz: "A
defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but
a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." Thus, if undisclosed facts are known
by publisher and recipient, no action will lie. If the publisher disclosed underlying facts
and those facts are defamatory, an action will lie for the defamatory facts but not for
the opinion based on those facts.
Most of the federal circuits have adopted the Gertz dicta. See McBride v. Merrell
Dow & Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 717 F.2d 1460, 1464 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 192-94 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds,
466 U.S. 495 (1984); Hammerhead Enters., Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 642 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d
1272, 1286 (5th Cir. 1981); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir.
1983); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983).
The differentiation between opinion and fact remains a difficult one in many
circumstances. See, e.g., Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied sub nom. Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Information
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The First Circuit reversed, 20 after conducting a totally independent re-
view of the evidence submitted at the trial, and determined that New York
Times malice had not been proved as a matter of law. Rule 52(A) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses.
The 6 to 3 majority of the United States Supreme Court held that when
reviewing a determination of a case governed by the New York Times stand-
ard of actual malice, the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(A) does
not prescribe the proper standard to be applied and that appellate courts
must exercise their independent judgment to determine whether New York
Times malice was proved with convincing clarity.' 21 The appellate judges may
make a de novo determination about the media defendant's state of mind
at the time of the alleged defamation from the record alone, without the
benefit of observing the actual testimony of the defendant. 22 The Bose de-
cision contributed nothing to resolving the tension between the rights of a
free press and a public figure's right to his reputation. By concentrating on
the malice standard and the plaintiff's burden of proof at the appellate level,
Bose only added to the confused state of post-Gertz defamation law.
23
Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980).
Likewise, most circuits view the distinction as a matter of law. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir.
1983); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
960 (1979).
120. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
491-92 (1984).
121. Id. at 514.
122. Id. at 518-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Note, The Future of Libel
Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 71 CORNELL L. REv. 477 (1986); Note, The Expanding
Scope of Appellate Review in Libel Cases - The Supreme Court Abandons the Clearly
Erroneous Standard of Review for Findings of Actual Malice, 36 MERCER L. REv. 711
(1985); Note, Constitutional Law - Independent Appellate Review Reaffirmed as Stand-
ard in Cases Requiring Determination of "Actual Malice," 19 Surtout U. L. REv. 94
(1985); Note, Can Civil Rule 52(a) Peacefully Co-Exist With Independent Review In
Actual Malice Cases?, 60 WAsH. L. REv. 503 (1985).
123. The ramifications of the Bose holding undoubtedly affected the outcome of
Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983). See infra notes
233, 238. After a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, the trial judge granted the defendants'
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. A three-judge panel of the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed the j.n.o.v. and reinstated the verdict against the Post
defendants and one of the two private defendants, Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90
(D.C. Cir. 1985), and denied a motion for rehearing, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
but the District of Columbia Circuit, en banc, vacated the decision of the panel and
agreed to rehear the case en banc. 763 F.2d at 1481. On rehearing, the court found the
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The Supreme Court again concentrated on the "convincing clarity"
standard in its 1986 decision in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson,124 in which
the Court held that at the summary judgment stage the "convincing clarity"
standard should be applied. The trial judge granted summary judgment for
the media defendants because the plaintiffs could not prove New York Times
malice as a matter of law.121 The District of Columbia Circuit reversed,2 6
preferring to follow a prior case 27 which set forth a two-step approach: on
the summary judgment motion, the judge should determine if "the plaintiff
can prove actual malice in the Times sense"; 128 if the court determines in the
affirmative, the judge at the end of the plaintiff's case at trial should de-
termine as a matter of law whether the actual malice has been proven with
''convincing clarity.''" 129 The District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that to
impose this increased proof requirement at the summary judgment stage
would in effect force the plaintiff "to try his entire case in pretrial affidavits
and depositions,"' 30 and found such an extension "simply incompatible with
the preliminary nature of the summary judgment inquiry.' 3' The United
States Supreme Court reversed, in a 6 to 3 decision, because the circuit court
evidence did not support a finding of constitutional malice with respect to any of the
defendants, and affirmed entirely the opinion of the district court. Tavoulareas v. Piro,
Nos. 83-1604, 83-1605 (D.C. Cir. March 13, 1987) (en banc).
124. 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
125. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201, 210 (D.D.C. 1983).
126. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
127. See Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 940 (1970).
128. Id. at 922 (Wright, J., concurring).
129. Id. (Wright, J., concurring).
130. Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1570. This is decidedly against principles of
procedure. See Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027, 1036 (10th Cir. 1978);
Jones v. Nelson, 484 F.2d 1165, 1168 (10th Cir. 1973); Walgren v. Howes, 482 F.2d
95, 98 (1st Cir. 1973); Perma Research and Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578
(2d Cir. 1969).
131. Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1571. The court stated:
If it were to be applied at that early stage, summary judgment would be
converted from a search for the minimum amount of evidence that could
persuade a reasonable person into the final assessment of "actual malice" by
the court itself - final, at least, if the court concludes actual malice has not
been established. That would compel the plaintiff to present his full case pre-
maturely, with the undesirable consequences described above. In addition, courts
of appeal would be burdened with the unusual task of making the largely
factual determination of actual malice in many cases where a judge or jury
verdict against the plaintiff would render that unnecessary.... [We believe
that the constitutional requirements of clear and convincing proof and inde-
pendent judicial determination of the ultimate issue of actual malice are to be
applied only after the plaintiff has had an opportunity to present his evidence.
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had not applied the New York Times "clear and convincing" evidentiary
standard to the lower court's grant of summary judgment:
[W]e conclude that the determination of whether a given factual dispute
requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary
standards that apply to the case. This is true at both the directed verdict
and summary judgment stages. Consequently, where the New York Times
clear and convincing evidence requirement applies, the trial judge's summary
judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the
evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard
could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, where
the factual dispute concerns actual malice, clearly a material issue in a New
York Times case, the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether
the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either
that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence
or that the plaintiff has not.132
Thus, the Liberty Lobby Court followed its prior decisions, concentrating
solely on the procedural tasks that confront the defamed plaintiff and avoid-
ing consideration of the basis of the defamation action: the falsity of the
publication.
C. The Dun & Bradstreet Decision-A "Side Step"
Gertz did not address the question of whether the qualified protections
afforded media defendants in defamation actions brought by private persons
should be extended to actions against non-media defendants. In Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,'3 3 the plaintiff, a private construction
company,134 brought a defamation action against the defendant credit re-
porting agency, which had sent to five subscribers a false report, submitted
by a high school student employed part time, that the business was bank-
rupt. 35 After a jury trial, Greenmoss was awarded both actual and punitive
damages, but the trial court on reviewing its jury instructions concluded that
they indicated an incorrect application of the Gertz standard' 36 and granted
the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court of Vermont
reversed, holding that the defendant, a non-media figure, was not entitled
132. 106 S. Ct. at 2514.
133. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
134. See Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461
A.2d 414 (1983). The private figure status of Greenmoss Builders, Inc., was not contested.
"Neither the parties nor the courts below have suggested that ... Greenmoss Builders
should be required to show actual malice to obtain a judgment and actual compensatory
damages." 105 S. Ct. at 2957 (Powell, J., dissenting).
135. 143 Vt. at 66, 461 A.2d at 415.
136. Id. at 69, 461 A.2d at 415.
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to Gertz protection'3 7 and declined to adopt the Gertz rules as part of the
common law of Vermont.
The Dun & Bradstreet Court did not consider whether Dun & Bradstreet
was a media or non-media defendant and thus whether or not to apply the
Gertz rule on that basis. It recognized the fact that there was disagreement
among the lower courts as to when Gertz applied, 138 yet declined to extend
application of Gertz as a matter of federal constitutional law. However, the
Vermont Supreme Court's refusal to apply Gertz had rested on the very fact
that the defendant was adjudged a non-media defendant.
The United States Supreme Court side-stepped the issue and affirmed
on decidedly different grounds. Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of
three, did not address the media/non-media distinction, 139 but rather relied
on a rationale different from that of the Vermont Supreme Court. A deter-
mination of whether the Gertz rule applied was made on an examination of
the type of speech involved. Thus, the original questions asked by both sides
and by the amici curiae went unanswered. Do Gertz first amendment pro-
tections apply to the non-media defendant? Must the private figure plaintiff,
like Greenmoss Builders, prove New York Times malice in order to obtain
punitive damages? Justice Powell's thirteen page plurality opinion never dis-
cussed the non-media question, whereas his opinion in Gertz referred over
twenty times to the media status of the defendant in the case.
40
The Dun & Bradstreet Court held that the Gertz rule as to presumed
and punitive damages applies only to defamatory speech of public concern 4'
and determined that the credit report served only the interests of Dun and
Bradstreet and the specific subscribers to whom the report had been sent.
142
137. Id. at 75, 461 A.2d at 418.
138. See 105 S. Ct. at 2942. See, e.g., Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318
N.W.2d 141, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982) (Gertz inapplicable to chairman of the
board of Business Week personally as he is a non-media defendant, but applicable to
Business Week magazine); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688
(1976) (Gertz applicable to all cases of libel and slander brought against non-media
defendants).
139. The Court initially heard only arguments concerning the media/non-media
distinction, but on reargument both plaintiffs and defendant's attorneys questioned
whether the Gertz rule "should apply where the speech is of a commercial or economic
nature." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greemnoss Builders, Inc., 468 U.S. 1214 (1984)
(ordering reargument). Nine months later when the case was decided, neither the media/
non-media distinction nor the commercial speech distinction were discussed.
140. In fact, five of the Justices expressly rejected the media/non-media distinc-
tion, viz. Justice White, concurring, and Justice Brennan and three fellow Justices,
dissenting. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-46; see also Note, Libel Law-Matters
of Non-Public Concern, 99 HAxv. L. Ray. 212 (1985); Note, The Supreme Court Creates
New Hurdle For Libel Defendants: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 60
ST. JomIN's L. Ry. 144 (1985).
141. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-46.
142. Id. at 2947.
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The Court reasoned that the report did not serve any "strong interest in the
free flow of commercial information," 43 and that the type of credit reporting
did not require special protection so that "debate on public issues [will] be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' 44 Justice Powell, who in Gertz had
balanced the individual states' interest in protecting private figures from
defamation 45 against first amendment freedoms, applied the same balancing
test. He reasoned that the same state interest was at stake 46 in so far that
in both Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet the plaintiffs were private figures, but
the first amendment interest at stake was even less, since Dun & Bradstreet
did not involve a matter of public concern. 47 Is it to be inferred from such
reasoning that the Dun & Bradstreet defendant is not a media defendant,
for the media only publishes matters of public concern? If so, Justice Powell
used a tautological way of answering the question raised by the Supreme
Court of Vermont.
The Dun & Bradstreet Court in effect reinterpreted the Gertz holding.
Despite the fact that Justice Powell asserted that "[iun Gertz . . . we held
that the First Amendment restricted the damages that a private individual
could obtain from a publisher for a libel that involved a matter of public
concern,' ' 48 the Gertz holding applied to all defamatory statements - not
only those which involved a matter of public interest. 49 In fact, the Gertz
Court specifically rejected the Rosenbloom distinction between public and
private issues.' 50 At first blush, the Dun & Bradstreet decision appears to
make the private figure plaintiff's position less burdensome in defamation
suits against both media and non-media defendants, but it actually has further
complicated our libel law. The Gertz public/private figure distinction has
been retained, but the Rosenbloom subject matter distinction has been res-
urrected.
Does the Dun & Bradstreet decision mean that to the already complicated
categories of public official/public figure/private person plaintiffs and me-
dia/non-media defendants we now must add the Rosenbloom element of
public concern/private matter? Do we now have twelve categories of defa-
mation law?'
143. Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
144. Id. (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270).
145. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, 352.
146. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2944-45.
147. Id. at 2947.
148. Id. at 2941.
149. The Gertz holding read: "We hold that, so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
150. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
151. For a tabular analysis, see Note, The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, 99
HAuv. L. Rlv. 120, 219 (1985).
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How does one define "speech of public concern?" As Justice Brennan
observed in his dissent, the credit report could not be considered "as purely
a matter of private discourse. 1 52 Dun & Bradstreet has created a great gray
area between what is clearly a matter of public concern and what is clearly
private and has not made the private figure plaintiff's burden less onerous.
And, it has added to, not dispersed, the "chilling effect" upon the media
defendant who may now be required to analyze before every publication the
public concern/private matter distinction which at a later date may be decided
by a judge or jury.
D. Falsity - The Essence of a Defamation Action
The post-New York Times and post-Gertz cases have generally empha-
sized status or malice when on a case by case basis the plaintiff's real interest
has invariably been publicizing the falsity of the alleged defamatory publi-
cation, resulting in suppression of the truth and denying the plaintiff a re-
stored reputation. Even when addressing situations where attention to the
matter of the truth or falsity of a publication could not be avoided, courts
continue to restrict the plaintiff to the sole remedy of money damages and
have allowed the introduction into defamation law of new doctrines which
add to the already heavy burden imposed on the plaintiff.
The Neutral Reportage Privilege
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court, in denying certiorari, let
stand a Second Circuit decision, Edwards v. National Audubon Society,
Inc.53 which set forth for the first time a new first amendment privilege,
that of "neutral reportage," where a republisher who accurately and disin-
terestedly reports defamatory statements made against public officials or
public figures is protected from liability, even though the reporter may be
aware of the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement. 5 4 Application of
152. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Edwards v. New York
Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
154. The circuit court developed its theory on the basis of Time, Inc. v. Pape,
401 U.S. 279 (1971), and Medina v. Time, Inc., 439 F.2d 1129 (lst Cir. 1971), but those
cases must be distinguished and are not deemed to have given rise to a constitutional
privilege of neutral reporting. See, e.g., Note, The Developing Privilege of Neutral
Reportage, 69 VA. L. REv. 853, 862-63 & n.51 (1983); Sowle, Defamation and the First
Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rnv.
469, 501-08 (1979). It should be noted that the Second Circuit held alternatively that
the plaintiff, as a matter of law, could not prove that the media defendant had published
the report with reckless disregard of the truth, so that in effect the "neutral reportage"
privilege was unnecessary in reaching its conclusion. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120-21.
The "neutral reportage" privilege as developed in Edwards must be distinguished
from the common law reporter's privilege or "record libel," which protects republication
of defamatory publications made in the course of official public proceedings. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 611 comment i (1971), and from privileges conveyed
by state statutes.
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this doctrine in effect protects the media republishers of defamatory state-
ments and contradicts the common law refusal to distinguish between the
liability of original publishers and republishers of defamatory matter.'55 In
Edwards, a nature reporter for the New York Times, in an article concerning
the crisis surrounding the use of the insecticide DDT, accurately reported an
accusation by an official of the National Audubon Society that some scientists
were "being paid to lie or [were] parroting something [they knew] little
about."' 6 The New York Times story quoted the Audubon official who
mentioned the names of five prominent scientists and quoted the denials of
three of the five scholars whom the reporter had reached. Both plaintiff and
defendants admitted that the New York Times article accurately reported the
substance of the Audubon official's accusation. The Second Circuit held that
it was constitutionally impermissible to find the New York Times liable for
defamation in this situation, for the totally neutral reportage of the news-
worthy accusation was privileged, and said "if we are to enjoy the blessings
of a robust and unintimidated press, we must provide immunity from def-
amation suits where the journalist believes, reasonably and in good faith,
that his report accurately conveys the charges made."' 57
Many courts have refused to adopt the Second Circuit's "constitutional
privilege" of neutral reportage on the grounds that the "newsworthiness"
element of the Edwards decision was in conflict with the Gertz Court's
rejection of the "newsworthiness" test of Rosenbloom.'58 Other courts have
adopted the privilege and have determined that the privilege does not chiefly
155. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 8, § 113, at 810-11.
156. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 118 (2d Cir 1977).
157. Id. at 120.
At stake in this case is a fundamental principle. Succinctly stated, when a
responsible, prominent organization like the National Audubon Society makes
serious charges against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the ac-
curate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's
private views regarding their validity. What is newsworthy about such accu-
sations is that they were made. We do not believe that the press may be required
under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy statements merely because
it has serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the press take up cudgels
against dubious charges in order to publish them without fear of liability for
defamation. The public interest in being fully informed about controversies
that often rage around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the
freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility for them.
Id. (citations omitted).
158. Note, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 VA. L. REv. 853,
863-65 (1983); see also Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978)
(Edwards also considered in conflict with St. Amant, since the reporter in Edwards may
entertain serious doubts, 583 F.2d at 1225); Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich.
App. 608, 325 N.W.2d 511 (1982) (press is already adequately protected by the New
York Times malice standard; additional protection is unneeded).
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depend on "newsworthiness." 159 The mere "neutrality" required by the doc-
trine when reporting serious charges against public officials or public figures
clearly puts the plaintiff at a severe disadvantage. While accurate and neutral
reporting is to be expected from a responsible press, republishing a statement
known to be or believed to be false without indication of that fact should
not be protected. 160
Prior Restraint Cases
In 1931 the United States Supreme Court curtailed the use of injunctions
as a remedy in defamation actions in Near v. Minnesota,6' in which it struck
down as unconstitutional a Minnesota public nuisance statute 62 which per-
mitted injunctions to be iss,,ed against newspapers which regularly published
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory"' 63 material. The denial of injunc-
tions is firmly rooted in two traditional common law concepts: 1) if there is
an available remedy at law, an equitable remedy will not be available,'6 and
2) the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech - the prohibition
of the prior restraint doctrine. 65 While prior restraint has been allowed in
certain privacy cases, 66 "any system of prior restraints of expression comes
to ... [the United States Supreme] Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity." 167
Strict adherence to this practice in all defamation actions leads to the
suppression of truth and to the imposition of acute injustice on certain
159. See, e.g., Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Sports
Illustrated published articles reporting accusations by a University of San Francisco
basketball player that the team coach had been involved in illegal recruitment methods
and illicit payments).
160. See generally Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation Should be Rejected, 33 HASTINGS L.J.
1203 (1982); Comment, "The Privilege of Neutral Reportage" - Edwards v. National
Audubon Society, Inc., 1978 UTAH L. REv. 347.
161. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
162. 1925 Session Laws of Minnesota, ch. 285, §§ 10123(1)-(3) (Mason 1927).
163. Id. at § 10123(1).
164. See, e.g., Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1967); Greenberg v.
DeSalvo, 254 La. 1019, 229 So. 2d 83 (1969), cert. denied sub nom. Greenberg v. Dunker,
397 U.S. 1075 (1970); Prucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479, 197 A.2d 253 (1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 992 (1964).
165. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Or-
ganization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne,
393 U.S. 175 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Crosby v.
Bradstreet, 312 F.2d 483 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911 (1963).
166. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (privacy
of an eleven-year-old boy arrested for a juvenile offense protected); Capitol Cities Media,
Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303 (1983) (names and addresses of jurors following a criminal
conviction could not be printed).
167. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
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plaintiffs. In Mazzacone v. Willing,' 8 an insolvent woman, with the unrea-
sonable belief that she had been defrauded of $25 by a law firm, picketed
the law firm's offices several hours daily with a large sign accusing the
attorneys of theft and, to attract attention, rang bells and blew whistles. The
Pennsylvania equity court enjoined the defendant from such activity, and on
appeal the Superior Court modified the order to the extent that she was
enjoined from "uttering or publishing statements to the effect that [the law
firm] stole money from her."' 169 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the equity court violated the woman's constitutional "right to
freely speak her opinion - regardless of whether that opinion is based on
fact or fantasy - regarding [the plaintiffs'] professional integrity,"' 70 and
that "[iun deciding whether a remedy is adequate, it is the remedy itself, and
not its possible lack of success that is the determining factor.''7 The injustice
worked on the plaintiffs in this case is most obvious. Precluded from all
remedies but continued suits for money damages against a judgment-proof
defendant, they must endure continuous defamatory publications which may
have a severe effect on prospective clients.
The inequity of denying injunctions in all defamation actions has been
severely criticized,' 72 but given the United States Supreme Court's consistent
zealous protection of first amendment rights in recent decisions, it is difficult
to imagine that the prior restraint doctrine will give way to the availability
of injunctive relief as a feasible remedy to a plaintiff harmed by a continuous
calculated campaign to destroy his reputation.
The "False Light" Cases
The right to protection against unreasonable interferences with an in-
dividual's right to privacy is generally recognized.' 7' When false statements
are made about an individual and a false impression is thereby created in
the public eye, a plaintiff should be able to recover for the reputational harm
suffered and have the opportunity to rectify the falsities ascribed to him.
168. 246 Pa. Super. 98, 369 A.2d 829 (1976), rev'd, 482 Pa. 377, 393 A.2d 1155
(1978).
169. 482 Pa. at 380, 393 A.2d at 1157.
170. 482 Pa. at 382, 393 A.2d at 1158.
171. 482 Pa. at 383, 393 A.2d at 1158.
172. See, e.g., Gold, Does Equity Still Lack Jurisdiction to Enjoin a Libel or
Slander?, 48 BRooK.YN L. Rv. 231 (1982); Note, Corporate Defamation and Product
Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLtJM. L. REv.
963 (1975); Note, Temporary Injunctions in Libel Cases, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 527 (1973).
173. The tort comprises the following four kinds of wrongs: 1.) appropriation of
a person's name or picture for commercial advantage; 2.) public disclosure of private
facts; 3.) intrusion upon a person's private affairs or seclusion; 4.) publication of facts




Such inaccurate publications may not necessarily be defamatory, but as in a
defamation action, the issue of the truth or falsity of the matter is the essence
of any action for damages. In 1952, the Hill family was held hostage in their
Pennsylvania house for nineteen hours by three escaped convicts but were
treated courteously and were released unharmed. Involuntarily involved in a
newsworthy event, the family sought to avoid publicity and moved to Con-
necticut. Six months later a novel was written about a family held captive
in a suburban home by three fugitive prisoners who assaulted and tormented
them, a story different from the account given by the Hills of what had
transpired during their own detention. In 1954, a play based on the novel
opened and Life magazine published an article about the play to the effect
that the Hill family of Connecticut was in fact the family fictionally depicted
in the theatrical production. After judgment for the Hills was affirmed in
their invasion of privacy action against Life by the New York Court of
Appeals, 74 the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that first amendment protections for free expression precluded applying New
York's pertinent privacy statute17 5 to redress false reports of a newsworthy
matter, in this instance the opening of a play, unless the publisher knew of
the falsity of the report or had acted in reckless disregard of the truth and
the jury was instructed accordingly.1 76 In extending the New York Times
174. See Hill v. Hayes, 18 A.D.2d 485, 240 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d
986, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965), rev'd sub. nom. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
175. In New York, the right of privacy is solely statutory, Civil Rights Law section
51 providing in part: "Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this
state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained... may maintain an equitable action ... and may also sue and recover
damages for any injuries sustained...." N.Y. Civ. Rr nrs LAw 51 (McKinney 1976).
176. Hill, 385 U.S. at 394. It should be noted that in an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, Justice Harlan stated:
I must part company with [the Court's] sweeping extension of the principles
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. It was established in New York Times
that mere falsity will not suffice to remove constitutional protection from
published matter relating to the conduct of a public official that is of public
concern. But that decision and those in which the Court has developed its
doctrine... have never found independent value in false publications nor any
reason for their protection except to add to the protection of truthful com-
munication. And the Court has been quick to note that where private actions
are involved the social interest in individual protection from falsity may be
substantial. Thus I believe that rigorous scrutiny of the principles underlying
the rejection of the mere falsity criterion and the imposition of ancillary safe-
guards, as well as the interest which the State seeks to protect, is necessary to
reach a proper resolution of this case.
Id. at 405-06 (Harlan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clarke joined,
Justice Fortas opposed the extension of the New York Times standard, stating:
For this Court totally to immunize the press - whether forthrightly or by
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malice standard to the "false light" cases, the Court was forced to address
the issue of the falsity of the publication but did not focus on it, concentrating
instead on the malice standard to be imposed on the private person plaintiff
in his suit against a media defendant.' 77 Whether or not a lesser standard of
proof may be applicable in invasion of privacy actions following Gertz's
defamation standards is uncertain. 78 In post-Gertz privacy decisions, the
Supreme Court declined to take the opportunity to consider the question,
79
although in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,8 0 a privacy case but not a
"false light" case, Justice Powell in a concurring opinion noted that the
Gertz decision's abandonment of the public interest Rosenbloom standard
"calls into question the conceptual basis of Time, Inc. v. Hill."''
The "Fictionalization" Cases
A court's immediate concentration on the issue of the falsity of the
publication and subsequent determination of the publisher's New York Times
subtle indirection - in areas far beyond the needs of news, comment on public
persons and events, discussion of public issues and the like would be no service
to freedom of the press, but an invitation to public hostility to that freedom.
This Court cannot and should not refuse to permit under state law the private
citizen who is aggrieved by the type of assault which we have here and which
is not within the specially protected core of the First Amendment to recover
compensatory damages for recklessly inflicted invasion of his rights.
Id. at 420 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
177. The Court stated:
Although the First Amendment principles pronounced in New York Times
guide our conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying these principles
in this discrete context. It therefore serves no purpose to distinguish the facts
here from those in New York Times. Were this a libel action, the distinction
which has been suggested between the relative opportunities of the public of-
ficial and the private opportunities of the public official and the private indi-
vidual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. And the additional state
interest in the protection of the individual against damage to his reputation
would be involved.
Id. at 390-91.
178. For a continued application of the New York Times standard, see Dodrell
v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1076 (1980); see also Phillips, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy and the Consti-
tutional Standard of Care, 16 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 77, 99 (1975). Some authors believe
that the Gertz standard is now applicable. See, e.g., Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under
the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1205, 1274 (1976); Lehmann, Triangulating
the Limits on the Tort of Invasion of Privacy: The Development of the Remedy in Light
of the Expansion of Constitutional Privilege, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543, 593 (1976).
179. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (New York
Times malice proved by knowingly false statements made in feature story about the
widow and children of a man killed in a bridge collapse).
180. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
181. Id. at 498 n.2.
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malice has characterized what may be termed the "fictionalization cases,"
where if the plaintiff is able to identify himself and prove that others also
identify him as the underlying real person portrayed in the supposedly fic-
tional work, the plaintiff may use the very statements by which he has been
identified and which ascribe to him words that were not his and actions he
did not take as proof that the publisher lied about him.'12 In 1969, author
Gwen Davis Mitchell published a novel, Touching, based on "nude mara-
thon" group therapy sessions in Southern California led by a fictitious phy-
sician, "Simon Herford, M.D.," who was portrayed as vulgar, sexually
promiscuous and unprofessional. Prior to signing her book contract with
Doubleday, Mitchell had attended a nude therapy session directed by Paul
Bindrim, Ph.D., after having signed a consent form whereby she agreed not
to write about the sessions or disclose the identify of any participant. Dr.
Bindrim8 3 specifically objected to several passages in which the fictitious Dr.
Herford tried vulgarly and callously to persuade a minister to bring his wife
to the next nude encounter and was depicted as having been responsible for
the death in an automobile accident of a patient who drove away from a
session in an emotionally charged state of mind. Tape recordings of the
session attended by author Mitchell revealed the gentle manner in which Dr.
Bindrim counselled the minister and the advice he gave to the participants
about the necessity to avoid driving for some time after sessions. In focussing
on the identification of the fictitious Dr. Herford with the real Dr. Bindrim,
the jury had little difficulty in deciding the statements ascribed to the fictional
Dr, Herford were defamatory of Dr. Bindrim.1' 4 In the "fictionalization"
182. In addition to identifying himself as the underlying person depicted in the
fiction, some courts hold that the plaintiff must prove that the defamatory publication
is not so bizarre that no one would believe it. See, e.g., Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270
(4th Cir. 1986), in which Reverend Jerry Falwell sued the publishers of Hustler magazine
over his portrayal in an "ad parody" as having committed incest. The jury returned a
verdict for the defendants "finding that no reasonable man would believe that the parody
was describing actual facts about Falwell." Id. at 1273. The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
however, a jury award to Falwell for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
183. See Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 984, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980); see also Silver, Libel, The
"Higher Truths" of Art, and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. Rv. 1065 (1978);
Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132
U. PA. L. Ry. 1 (1983).
184. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39 ("The test is whether
a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand that the fictional character
therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described."); see also Pring
v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), in which the plaintiff, a Miss
Wyoming, sought to identify herself as a "Miss Wyoming" portrayed in a salacious
parody.
The basic question which had to be resolved at the trial was in two parts -
whether the publication was about the plaintiff, that is whether it was of and
concerning her as a matter of identity; and secondly, whether the story must
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cases New York Times malice seems to be proved or naturally flows from
the fictionalization itself. Ironically, if the underlying fiction is not false
enough, i.e., the actual person is identifiable, the fictitious statements at-
tributable to the fictional character are viewed as knowingly false, i.e., ma-
licious publications about the real person. Preoccupation with the plaintiff's
legal status and proof of New York Times malice are sidestepped by avoiding
them altogether.
The "Libel-Proof Plaintiff" and "Subsidiary Libel"
Doctrines
In the post-New York Times and post-Gertz years, two new doctrines
have been applied in defamation actions by some courts and, if they gain
more widespread acceptance and are allowed to develop, many media-de-
famed plaintiffs will have less chance of prevailing in their efforts to vindicate
reputations.
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine was first proposed in Cardillo v. Dou-
bleday & Co., Inc.'85 The plaintiff, an incarcerated organized crime figure,
sued the publisher of My Life in the Mafia for allegedly libellous statements.
The Second Circuit held "as a matter of lav . . . [the plaintiff] is for
purposes of this case, libel-proof, i.e., so unlikely by virtue of his life as a
habitual criminal to be able to recover anything other than nominal damages
as to warrant dismissal of the case, involving as it does First Amendment
considerations."' 86 A second libel-proof plaintiff theory, referred to as "the
incremental harm branch of the libel-proof doctrine,"'' 87 was introduced in
reasonably be understood as describing actual facts or events about plaintiff
or actual conduct of the plaintiff.
Id. at 439. For a case in which the plaintiff was unsuccessful in identifying herself as
the real person portrayed as a fictional character, see Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d
315, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 916, 470 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1983).
185. 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff
Doctrine, 98 HAgv. L. REv. 1909 (1985).
186. Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 639. In a Second Circuit decision the following year,
Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977), the
court refused to apply the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in a defamation action by William
F. Buckley, Jr., who had been denominated a "fellow-traveller of fascists." Id. at
884. The court preferred to confine the theory to the facts of Cardillo. See also Logan
v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978) (previously convicted drug
user); Wynberg v. National Enquirer, 564 F. Supp. 924, 928 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (several
previous convictions of criminal offenses involving women had given plaintiff a "rep-
utation for taking advantage of women generally.").
187. See Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 310 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 2916 (1986).
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Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union.'88 According to this theory, if the
"incremental harm" arising from challenged statements adds very little to
the harm inflicted by unchallenged statements in the same article or broad-
cast, that harm is so minimal that it is practically non-existent, and accord-
ingly the challenged statements are determined to be non-actionable.
Second Circuit district courts have nevertheless been cautious before
invoking the doctrine. In Sharon v. Time, Inc.,189 Ariel Sharon, a former
Israeli Defense Minister brought a defamation action against Time Magazine
for an allegedly libellous statement in a report on the findings of the Kahan
Commission, appointed by the Israeli government to investigate the massacre
of Palestinians in Lebanon in September 1982. In denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss, the district court accepted the defendant's claim that
Sharon's reputation had been severely affected by unchallenged material in
the article as a whole, but concluded that Sharon's "reputation cannot be
said as a matter of law to have been so damaged by the reported events that
he could recover only nominal damages. . . ."10 In Herbert v. Lando, after
partial grant of summary judgments for the media defendants' 91 the district
court judge denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on the in-
cremental harm theory and distinguished the case at bar from Simmons Ford
in that the plaintiff in Simmons Ford challenged only one statement in a
lengthy article and Herbert challenged many of the assertions made about
him.192 Since damage to reputation is a sine qua non element of a defamation
action,193 proponents of the developing libel-proof plaintiff doctrine argue
that if a plaintiff's reputation is very low in the eyes of the public, he can
suffer no damage by further defamation, or that if he does not challenge
statements that are very damaging to reputation in the same article or pub-
lication, a challenge to less damaging statements would not be meritorious.
Both theories played a significant role in the course of Liberty Lobby's
defamation action against Jack Anderson, the reknowned reporter in his
capacity as publisher of The Investigator magazine. Two articles published
in the October 1981 issue of The Investigator portrayed Liberty Lobby and
Willis A. Carto, its founder and chief lobbyist, as Neo-Nazi, fascist, anti-
188. 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Simmons Ford, a media defendant
criticized a new electric car and rated it "Not Acceptable." The article set forth numerous
reasons for the rating, but only one paragraph was challenged by the plaintiff. Since
the unchallenged portions were worse criticisms than the challenged paragraph, the court
held only nominal damages might be possible and granted summary judgment for the
defendant. Id. at 751.
189. 575 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
190. Id. at 1169.
191. 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986) (nine allegedly defamatory statements found to
be non-actionable, but three were judged actionable).
192. Id. at 311.
193. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974).
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semitic and racist. In the ensuing defamation action, the media defendants
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the limited purpose public
figure plaintiffs could not prove actual malice as a matter of law, and that
the plaintiffs were "libel-proof" and thus could not recover any damages
because their reputations were already so besmirched in the public eye that
no injury to reputation could have occurred by the alleged defamatory pub-
lications. 94 The trial judge granted summary judgment for the media defend-
ants because the plaintiffs could not prove actual malice as a matter of law,19S
but did not address the defendants' contention that the plaintiffs were "libel-
proof". 96
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court considered the libel-
proof plaintiff doctrine at length. 97 Judge Scalia, writing for a unanimous
court, rejected the libel-proof plaintiff theory "because we think it a fun-
damentally bad idea, we are not prepared to assume that it is the law of the
District of Columbia; nor is it part of federal constitutional law."' 9 The
court would not accept a "rule that a conscious, malicious libel is not ac-
tionable so long as it has been preceded by earlier assertions of the same
untruths."' 99 Alternately, the court rejected the "incremental harm branch"
of the doctrine: "This apparently equitable theory loses much of its equity
when one realizes that the reason the unchallenged portions are unchallenged
may not be that they are true, but only that [the plaintiffs] were unable to
assert that they were willfully false. '" 200 In vacating the judgment, the United
States Supreme Court never addressed the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, so
the rejection of that doctrine would seem to remain the law of the District
of Columbia Circuit.201
After a decade of litigation involving exhaustive discovery, all defendants in
Herbert v. Lando0 2 moved for summary judgment. The district court held
that as a matter of law a jury could not find that nine of the eleven allegedly
defamatory statements were false, defamatory and made with New York
194. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1983).
195. Id. at 210.
196. Id. at 209 n.12.
197. See Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568-69 (D.D.C. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
198. Id. at 1569.
199. Id. at 1568.
200. Id.
201. The defendants in Liberty Lobby requested the United States Supreme Court
to review the circuit court's holding on the libel-proof plaintiff issue in their certiorari
petition, but the Court declined to do so. The opportunity remained for the Court to
discuss the doctrine in dicta, but it did not.
202. 596 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Times malice. 203 The court did not apply the "libel-proof" plaintiff doctrine
and would have allowed the case to proceed on the remaining two statements.
The Second Circuit4 reversed as to the two remaining statements and im-
plicitly endorsed the incremental harm theory of the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine,205 although granting summary judgment for the defendants on a
"subsidiary libel" doctrine 6 which in effect holds that a defamatory factual
statement should be non-actionable if it is an "outgrowth of and subsidiary
to" °7 larger allegedly defamatory statements which may be incapable of
disproof. This novel rule, in support of which the Second Circuit cited no
cases, seems analogous to the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine0" - and the court
recognized this as well as the fact that its decision may be viewed as granting
the media defendant an absolute immunity to defame a public or private
figure plaintiff, provided that the defamatory statements, even those made
with New York Times malice, were subsidiary to the "larger" statements.2 °9
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari and thus let stand in the
Second Circuit both the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and the new "subsid-
iary" libel theory. 210
The Issue of Falsity
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps21' was a suit by a private person
plaintiff against a media defendant in a jurisdiction where the negligence
standard applied. A series of five "investigative" articles appearing in The
203. Id. at 1226.
204. 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986).
205. Id. at 310-11.
206. Id. at 311-12; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari (Herbert, Petitioner),
at 9.
207. 781 F.2d at 312.
208. Id. at 311 n.10 ("Some may view our holding today as a variation of the
'libel-proof' plaintiff doctrine, but we need not so characterize it.").
209. Id. at 312. The court explained:
We do not mean to imply by our holding that appellees could have published
with impunity a vast collection of false statements so extensive as to portray
Herbert as a liar in every respect. Such a portrayal may well be actionable.
Rather, we hold that if the appellees' published view that Herbert lied about
reporting war crimes was not actionable, other statements - even those that
might be found to have been published with actual malice - should not be
actionable if they merely imply the same view, and are simply an outgrowth
of and subsidiary to those claims upon which it has been held there can be
no recovery. We do not intend by our holding to permit defamation defend-
ants to freely embellish their stories vith falsehoods while remaining free
from liability.
Id. at 312.
210. See Herbert v. Lando, 106 S. Ct. 2916 (1986).
211. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
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Philadelphia Inquirer between May 1975 and May 1976 purported to link
Maurice S. Hepps, the principle shareholder of a corporation which granted
franchises for beer and soda distributorships, with organized crime. 2 2 In a
suit in a Pennsylvania state court for defamation against the publisher and
two reporters, Hepps, concededly a private person plaintiff, bore the burden
of proving either negligence or malice on the part of the media defendants,
but a Pennsylvania statute2l3 had codified the decisional law and placed upon
the defendants the burden of proving "the truth of the defamatory com-
munication. "214
The trial court determined the statute unconstitutional because of the
presumption of the falsity of the defamatory statement and instructed the
jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the
defamation. 215 The jury returned a general verdict for the media defendants. 21 6
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that Gertz
only required that the private person plaintiff prove the fault of the media
defendant and that showing fault did not require proving falsity. 2 7 The court
relied on the Pennsylvania law of libel as it had developed over the years218
and reiterated the presumption that the principle that a person was innocent
until proven guilty transcended the criminal law and applied to the law of
defamation. 2 9 The majority opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stressed that "where the accusation is totally general and without the spe-
212. For example, one article asserted that federal agents had evidence of the
direct financial involvement of a leader of organized crime in the corporation con-
trolled by Hepps. As to this statement, the defamatory character of which was not
in dispute, plaintiff Hepps merely denied knowledge that the crime figure was em-
ployed by a consultant firm which was in turn employed by some of Hepps' cor-
poration's franchises. See Testimony of Maurice Hepps, Jr., Tr. 2185-86, 2200.
213. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(b)(1) (1978).
214. Id.
215. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1560. It should also be noted that at trial the media
defendants invoked on many occasions Pennsylvania's "shield law." See 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (1982) ("no person ... employed by any newspaper ... or
any radio or television station, or any magazine ... shall be required to disclose the
source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal pro-
ceeding ... ."). Plaintiff Hepps asked that the jury be instructed to draw a negative
inference from the media defendants' invocation of the statute; the media defendants
requested that no inferences be drawn. The trial judge gave neither instruction. Hepps,
106 S. Ct. at 1561.
216. Id. at 1560.
217. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1561.
218. See generally Note, Tort Law - Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.:
The Validity of the Common Law Presumption of Falsity in Light of New York
Times and Its Progeny, 61 NOTRE DAim L. REv. 125 (1986).
219. Hepps, 506 Pa. 304, 311,485 A.2d 374, 378, rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1784 (1986); see also Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441
Pa. 432, 448-49, 273 A.2d 899, 907-08 (1971); Montgomery v. Dennison, 363 Pa.
255, 263 n.2, 169 A.2d 520, 525 n.2 (1949).
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cificity necessary for a response, the absence of such a presumption [of the
falsity of the defamatory statement] would force the plaintiff into the unen-
viable position of proving the negative." 20
In a 5 to 4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
"where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure
plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements
at issue are false,"'' 2 and that "the common-law presumption that defam-
atory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a
media defendant for speech of public concern." ' m Thus, the private person
plaintiff223 is now on the same footing as to the issue of falsity as the public
official and public figure plaintiff, who, following New York Times and its
progeny, have had the burden of proving falsity from the very fact that they
had to prove New York Times malice - knowledge of the falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted
that there will be cases where the plaintiff will not be able to prove falsity
when in fact the publication is false, but that the Constitution requires that
the scales be tipped in favor of the media defendant to protect free speech
and to avoid the "chilling" effect on free speech resulting from the media's
fear of possible liability.2 24
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens, writing for a united minority,
assailed the majority opinion as giving "the character assassin a constitutional
220. Hepps, 506 Pa. at 312, 485 A.2d at 378; see Franklin & Bussel, The
Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WiMi. & MARY L. REv.
825, 851-87 (1984). It should be noted that plaintiffs are often required to "prove a
negative," e.g., in misrepresentation actions where the falsity of the representation
must be proved.
221. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1559.
222. Id. at 1564.
223. Several post-Gertz decisions had already shifted the burden of proof on
the issue of falsity to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir.) (according to the negligence standard applied by Ten-
nessee, private person plaintiff must prove falsity of defendant newspaper's charges
that cattle were starving on plaintiff's ranch); Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. Sindorf, 276
Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976) (former employee brought defamation action against
former employer, a non-media defendant; Maryland Court of Appeals applied Gertz
to both media and non-media defendants as to proof of falsity, and adopted standard
set by RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975), i.e., a
negligence standard); Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (defa-
mation action against media defendant in which the Fourth Circuit held that the
Jacron decision correctly interpreted the Restatement Second standard and should
apply); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, cert. denied sub nom.
Fleming v. Moore, 105 S. Ct. 3513 (1985) (four consolidated defamation actions in
which all plaintiffs were private persons and three of the four defendants were media
members; the Virginia Supreme Court interpreted Gertz as mandating all plaintiffs
to prove falsity).
224. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1564.
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license to defame," 22 for if a member of the media knew that it would be
impossible for a private person plaintiff to prove the falsity of a defamation
and published the defamation, not only with New York Times malice but
with actual common law malice that could be proved by the plaintiff, the
publication would nevertheless be constitutionally protected. 226 The minority
saw "little . . .basis for a concern that a significant amount of true speech
will be deterred unless the private person victimized by a malicious libel can
also carry the burden of proving falsity," 227 since the media defendant is
already protected by the Gertz requirement that the plaintiff prove some
fault.
At first blush, Hepps seems to extend significantly the trend of New
York Times and its progeny. However, the holding is quite narrow and is
confined only to the award of money damages, viz. "a private-figure plaintiff
must bear the burden of [proving falsity] before recovering damages for
defamation from a media defendant." 22 Nothing indicates that the burden
of proof shifts in a suit against a non-media defendant. Nothing was said
of a shift in the burden should a private person seek an equitable remedy
rather than money damages. The real significance of the decision is that the
Hepps Court squarely addressed the essence of the defamation action - the
falsity of the publication - and more importantly, provided that a remedy
other than money damages may be available to the media-defamed plaintiff.
"Nor need we consider what standards should apply . . . if a State were to
provide a plaintiff with the opportunity to obtain a judgment that declared
the speech at issue to be false but did not give rise to liability for damages." 229
Echoing Justice White's vigorous dissent in Gertz,2a0 this may indicate that
the United States Supreme Court may now be willing to afford to the plaintiff
the opportunity to vindicate his reputation in a simple, direct and inexpensive
way.
Summary
The more than two decades since New York Times v. Sullivan consti-
tutionalized the common law of defamation have resulted in some clarifi-
cation of the New York Times holding and its ramifications on plaintiffs
and media defendants. But how far have we come? Are matters even more
225. Id. at 1568 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1571.
228. Id. at 1564. The Hepps Court was silent as to what quantity of proof,
i.e., preponderance of the evidence or the "clear and convincing evidence" standard,
applies to the plaintiff on the issue of falsity.
229. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1565 n.4.
230. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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confused and nebulous than in the early days after the New York Times
decision?
There is no serious proposal to return to the full-blown, strict liability
common law of defamation. The first amendment guarantees freedom of
expression on public questions, and as a nation we are committed to "the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." 231 There is no place where debate is more vigorous than in the
media. Debate and commentary, as well as reporting on news stories as they
break, would be severely hampered if the media were constrained to ponder
and consider the absolute, total veracity of every statement uttered or pub-
lished. But, the individual's right to protect his reputation inevitably comes
into conflict with the day-to-day operation of a totally protected media. The
courts have carefully and properly balanced the individual's rights and the
public good. Both must be protected, and in a free society some abuse must
be tolerated. 2
The "chilling effect" of the possibility of incurring substantial liability
because of a good faith mistake or the simple negligence of an employee
would stultify the media, and the enormous burden of legal fees incurred in
the defense of defamation suits could be financially disastrous. 3 The cost
of discovery and the loss of time in the process can likewise be enormous. 4
To a great extent, the necessity of proving New York Times malice has halted
the onslaught of verdicts against media defendants. Despite the fact that
between 1981 and 1984, news organizations lost 83 per cent of defamation
cases tried before juries,2 5 the media defendants prevailed in 90 per cent of
231. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
232. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876) ("Some
degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance
is this more true than in that of the press.").
233. See Abrams, Why We Should Change Libel Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29,
1985, § 6 (Sunday Magazine), at 90. It is estimated that CBS spent more than $5
million to defend the defamation action brought by General Westmoreland. Legal
fees paid by CBS and the other defendants in the twelve years of the Herbert v.
Lando litigation may have exceeded $3 million.
Plaintiffs are also affected by the costs of litigation. General Ariel Sharon re-
portedly spent in excess of $1 million in his suit against Time, Inc. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1985, at B4, col. 1. William Tavoulareas, president of Mobil Oil Corpo-
ration, expended almost $3 million in his suit against The Washington Post. See
advertisement by William P. Tavoulareas in N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, at 25, col.
1; see also supra note 123 and infra note 238 and accompanying text.
234. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 205 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting), it
is noted that almost 3000 pages of transcript were generated by the Lando deposition
alone in the first year of discovery. The defendants had also produced in that year
all of their notes with more than 120 people, as well as voluminous files, transcripts,
videotapes and documents. See Brief of Respondents, in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, at 2 n.1 (no. 85-1685).
235. Jury awards have been enormous, e.g., $40 million in Lerman v. Flynt
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those cases at appellate levels. 2 6 However, the costs of discovery and the
time-consuming process remain, although the Liberty Lobby Court's demand
that the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard be applied at the motion
for summary judgment level may work to the benefit of media defendants
before exhaustive discovery has taken place. The negligence standard of Gertz,
which has been adopted by a majority of the states in suits by private persons
against media defendants, precludes facile granting of summary judgment.
The Dun & Bradstreet Court's dangerous resurrection of the Rosenbloom
"public concern" standard may be a two-edged sword, allowing the court
to consider it at the summary judgment stage and thus in some instances
lessening the media defendant's burden, although at the same time adding
to the "chill" imposed on a media figure debating whether it should or
should not publish a story in light of the fact that some court may hold that
the subject matter of the story was not of "public concern."
The plaintiff, on the other hand, has not fared so well as a result of
Supreme Court and some circuit court decisions in recent years. First, we
must consider the public official or public figure plaintiff in the wake of
New York Times. He feels his reputation has been damaged, perhaps ruined,
by a defamatory publication which may have had widespread circulation.
23 7
At the time of commencing suit, he cannot prove special damages, for the
long term effect of the defamatory statement upon his career in politics or
business cannot be ascertained. The only remedy available to him is money
damages, which will not be awarded unless New York Times malice can be
proven with clear and convincing clarity, which may in fact be decided at
the early stage of a motion for summary judgment before he has the op-
portunity for full discovery. In effect, the plaintiff is unable to restore his
reputation. Of course, he may resort to his own resources and attempt to
have his defenses to the alleged defamatory publication printed or aired, but
any vindication by an independent third party is unavailable to him. 238
Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); $25.025 million in Pring v. Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982); $19.2 million awarded to entertainer Wayne
Newton against NBC, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1986, at A26, col. 1.
236. See Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin, No. 12 (Winter 1984); see
also Franklin, Suing The Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FoUND.
REs. J. 795 (results of a study of 291 defamation suits against media defendants).
237. The New York Times has a daily circulation in excess of 1,275,000. See
Statement of Ownership Management and Circulation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986.
Time magazine's weekly circulation within the United States is over 4.6 million.
Telephone interview with representative of Time magazine management.
238. Recent efforts by public figures to restore their reputations have received
extensive press coverage. In two articles published on Nov. 30, and Dec. 1, 1979,
The Washington Post charged that the president of Mobil Oil Corporation, William
Tavoulareas, "set up" his son in a lucrative shipping firm with which Mobil had
ties, and indicated that he may have broken the law. In fact, the evidence was very
slight that William Tavoulareas had placed his son in the position, and the intimation
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The growth of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is a further obstacle to
the public figure plaintiff in a defamation action against a media defendant.
From the very fact that celebrities are so frequently in the public eye and
are regularly the subjects of media attention, many have reputations which
have been adversely affected. As Judge Scalia succinctly remarked:
The law . . proceeds upon the optimistic premise that there is a little bit
of good in all of us-or perhaps upon the pessimistic assumption that no
matter how bad someone is, be can always be worse. It is shameful that
Benedict Arnold was a traitor; but he was not a shop-lifter to boot, and
one should not have been able to make that charge while knowing its falsity
with impunity. 9
The United States Supreme Court has avoided addressing the doctrine with
the result that, in the Second Circuit at least, it has been allowed to develop.
In less than ten years, the original doctrine has spawned the incremental
harm theory24° and most recently, the subsidiary libel theory. 24'
VI. PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR THE DEFAMED PLAINTIFF
Before and after New York Times various means have been proposed
to ease the burden of the media-defamed plaintiff and to assist him in ob-
taining what he really wants: a restored reputation. An analysis reveals that
of illegality was groundless or extremely tenuous. Father and son sued for libel and
the case finally went to trial in July of 1983. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90,
98-103 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Almost four years later, the case ended with the District of
Columbia Circuit affirming the trial court's grant of j.n.o.v. for the defendants.
William Tavoulareas estimated the suit cost him personally well in excess of $2.5
million. See supra note 233.
On January 23, 1982, a CBS Reports documentary titled "The Uncounted En-
emy: A Vietnam Deception" charged that General William Westmoreland had lied
to President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff by understating the number of
enemy troops in Vietnam. This alleged deception resulted in the total unpreparedness
of the American forces for the Tet offensive of January 1968. See N.Y. Times, Feb.
2, 1985, at B2, col. 1. The suit was settled during trial in February 1985, after
millions of dollars were spent. CBS did not disavow the 1982 documentary and did
not pay any money to General Westmoreland.
On February 21, 1983, Time magazine published a cover story, "Verdict on the
Massacre," in which it asserted that on the morning after the assassination of Bashir
Gemayel in Beirut, Lebanon, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon had discussed
with the Gemayel family "the need for the Phalangists to take revenge." Sharon v.
Time, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The massacre of Palestinian
refugees at the Sabra and Shatila camps took place soon after on September 15,
1982. Both sides claimed victory when the jury held that Minister Sharon had in fact
been defamed, but that no money damages could be awarded since he had not
established New York Times malice on the part of Time magazine.
239. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (1984).
240. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
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in fact the plaintiff has not been helped to any great degree and has no
alternate choice to bringing an action for money damages.
A. Retraction Statutes
At common law a full retraction by a defendant which received "the
same publicity and prominence as the defamation" 2 was available as a
"partial" defense and served to mitigate damages. Thirty states have some
form of retraction statute in force, which usually precludes the plaintiff from
being awarded punitive damages.243 Basic to all the statutes is the requirement
that the plaintiff notify the defendant of the alleged defamatory publication
prior to initiating suit or within a certain time period, after which the defend-
ant has a limited period of time in which to make a retraction in the same
manner or with the same space and position as the original publication. If
the defendant does not do so, the plaintiff may offer the failure to retract
as a bar to mitigation of damages. The object of retraction statutes is obvious:
the plaintiff is given the opportunity of vindicating his reputation in the same
manner as he was originally defamed and the defendant is afforded the
opportunity to have possible damages mitigated as a result of compliance
with the statute. If no retraction is published, the plaintiff may recover
special, general and punitive damages, subject of course to the Gertz limi-
tations.
The constitutional difficulties raised by the United States Supreme Court
in regard to right of reply statutes244 do not apply to retraction statutes since
none convey the power to a court to order a retraction to be published by
242. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 8, at 846.
243. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-185 (1975); Aiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-653.01-
12-653.05 (1986); CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(a) (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-237 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANNr. § 770.01, .02 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §
51-5-11 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 6-712 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-14-1, 2, and
34-4-15-1, 2 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 659.2-.4 (West Supp. 1986); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 411.051 (Bobbs-Merrill 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 153
(1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 93 (West 1986); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §
600.2911 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. §
95-1-5 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-818, 819, 821 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. §
25-840.01 (1985); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.336 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West
1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-2 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-08 (1985); OHIo
Rnv. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.03, .13, .14., .15 (Baldvin 1981); OIu.A. REv. CODE ANN.
tit 12, § 1446a (West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.160, .165, .170 (1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-11-7 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-24-103 (1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 45-2-1 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-48 (Michie 1986); W. VA. CODE
§ 57-24 (Michie 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895-.05 (West 1986).
244. See infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
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the defendant. 5 Retraction statutes effectively encourage the media defend-
ant to publish a full admission of falsity or, as is more likely the case, a
"taking back" of the original publication. If the plaintiff will settle for such
a "taking back," which is considerably less than an admission of falsity,
such statutes may well serve to reduce the number of defamation actions.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff wants more than a simple retraction which
may not completely disperse doubts about the underlying truth or falsity of
the publication, such statutes afford no relief to the defamed public official
or public figure plaintiff from the burden of proving New York Times malice
with clear and convincing clarity, and thus do little to afford the plaintiff
vindication by an independent third party.
B. Right of Reply Statutes
A suggested method of vindicating a defamed plaintiff's reputation has
been a statutorily mandated "right of reply," published by the media defend-
ant in the same manner and with the same prominence as the original pub-
lication was made. The constitutional problems raised by such statutes were
recognized at an early date.2 6 Patterned after European and South American
statutes which require the media to print court-ordered replies or retrac-
tions,247 the only generil right of reply statute in force for any considerable
period of time in the United States was that of Nevada, which in any event
was repealed in 1969.21
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of right of reply statutes in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.249
Under the Florida limited right of reply statute then in force, a political
245. Such a type of retraction statute allowing a court-ordered publication has
been proposed. See Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1730, 1742 (1967). In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, Justice
Brennan, in a concurring opinion, understood the decision as addressing only "right
of reply" statutes and not implying any "view upon the constitutionality of 'retrac-
tion' statutes affording plaintiffs able to prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory
action to require publication of a retraction. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
246. Statutes in Michigan and Kansas were held unconstitutional. See Park v.
Detroit Free Press, 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888); Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan.
670, 75 P. 1041 (1904). Statutes in Minnesota and Florida were upheld. See Allen v.
Pioneer Press, Co., 40 Minn. 180, 40 N.W. 936 (1889); Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412
(Fla. 1950).
247. The first such law was enacted in France in 1822. See I BARBMR, Code
Explique de la Presse (2d ed. 1911). For a discussion of the foreign statutes, see
Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L.
REv. 867, 884-91 (1948).
248. See NEv. RFv. STAT. § 200.570 (1963) (repealed, 55th Sess. Laws, ch. 310,
§ 10 (1969)).
249. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
19871
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
candidate could request free space to reply to any attack upon his personal
character.2 0 Tornillo, executive director of a teachers' union and a candidate
for the Florida House of Representatives in 1972, was severely criticized by
two editorials for previously leading an "illegal" teachers strike. Under sec-
tion 104.38 he demanded to reply "in as conspicuous a place and in the same
kind of type as the charges which prompted the reply.' '25 A unanimous
United States Supreme Court held that the statute violated the first amend-
ment's guarantee of a free press:252 "The Florida statute operates as a com-
mand in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding [a newspaper]
to publish specified matter."' 53 The Tornillo Court further held that the
Florida statute intruded into the function of editors in deciding what should
be printed and how public issues and officials should be treated .2
4
The only right of reply statute now in force is a Mississippi law255 which
provides that if a newspaper shall print an editorial'or news story "reflecting
upon the honesty and integrity or moral character"256 of a political candidate,
the politician may demand that his reply to the charges be printed. Courts
have so strictly interpreted and applied the statute that it has in effect been
overturned. 257 The constitutional problems associated with such statutes, as
well as the reluctance of legislatures to enact legislation because of those
250. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (repealed 1975) provided:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any can-
didate for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said can-
didate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his
official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such news-
paper shall upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost
any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same
kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply
does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm
failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, or §
775.083.
Id. For the legislative history of the statute, see Hoffer & Butterfield, The Right to
Reply: A Florida First Amendment Abbreviation, 53 JouiRN. Q. 2 (1976).
251. 418 U.S. at 244.
252. The statute had been previously held unconstitutional in the one reported
case in which it had been invoked prior to Tornillo. See State v. News-Journal Corp.,
36 Fla. Supp. 164 (Volusia County Ct. 1972).
253. 418 U.S. at 256.
254. Id. at 258.
255. Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-3-35 (1986).
256. Id.
257. See Gulf Publishing Company, Inc. v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687 (Miss. 1983)
(public official charged with favoring other officials in selecting locations of paved
roads denied the right to reply under § 23-3-35 which must be strictly construed);
Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So. 2d 91 (1953) (unjust criticism of state




problems, 218 prevent right of reply statutes from being a feasible remedy to
a plaintiff defamed by a media defendant.
C. The "Schumer Bill"
Representative Charles E. Schumer 259 has proposed H.R. 2846260 in the
99th Congress, which as drafted offers a codified remedy to public officials
258. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 363 Mass. 909, 298 N.E.2d 829
(1973), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court advised that a right of
reply statute being considered by the Great and General Court would be held un-
constitutional.
259. Democrat, New York.
260. H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 85 (1985), reads as
follows:
SECTION 1. ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT THAT
STATEMENT IS FALSE AND DEFAMATORY.
(a) CAUSE OF ACTION.-
(1) A public official or public figure who is the subject of a publication
or broadcast which is published or broadcast in the print or electronic media
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for a declaratory
judgment that such publication or broadcast was false and defamatory.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to require proof of the state
of mind of the defendant.
(3) No damages shall be awarded in such an action.
(b) BURDEN OF PROOF.-
The plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment under subsection (a) shall
bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence each element
of the cause of action described in subsection (a).
(c) BAR TO CERTAIN CLAIMS.-
A plaintiff who brings an action for a declaratory judgment under
subsection (a) shall be forever barred from asserting any other claim or cause
of action arising out of a publication or broadcast which is the subject of
such action.
(d) ELECTION BY DEFENDANT.-
(1) A defendant in an action brought by a public official or public
figure arising out of a publication or broadcast in the print or electronic
media which is alleged to be false and defamatory shall have the right, at
the time of filing its answer or within 90 days from the commencement of
the action, whichever comes first, to designate the action as an action for
a declaratory judgment pursuant to subsection (a).
(2) Any action designated as an action for a declaratory judgment
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be treated for all purposes as if it had been
filed originally as an action for a declaratory judgment under subsection
(a), and the plaintiff shall be forever barred from asserting or recovering
for any other claim or cause of action arising out of a publication or broad-
cast which is the subject of such action.
SECTION 2. LIMITATION ON ACTION.
Any action arising out of a publication or broadcast which is alleged
to be false and defamatory must be commenced not later than one year
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and public figures defamed by a media defendant. The plaintiff may elect
to receive a judicial declaratory judgment26' which would preclude him from
a future action for money damages,262 provided the plaintiff proves with clear
and convincing evidence that he is a public official or public figure defamed
by a published statement concerning him which was false and defamatory.263
The bill would seem to afford the plaintiff the opportunity to vindicate his
reputation without the expense and time spent on lengthy discovery and
without the burden of proving New York Times malice. Closer study reveals
a plethora of problems. The proposed bill also affords a media defendant
the right to convert an action against it for money damages into an action
for a judicial declaratory judgment,2 and if the defendant so chooses, the
suit is handled as if the plaintiff had originally chosen the declaratory judg-
ment remedy under the statute.21 Reasonable attorney's fees would be awarded
to the prevailing party,27
As proposed, the Schumer Bill would not solve many problems of the
media-defamed plaintiff. Notwithstanding the doubtful authority of Congress
to enact such a bill,2 7 the option of the media defendant to convert a plain-
tiff's action for money damages into an action for a declaratory judgment
after the first date of such publication or broadcast.
SECTION 3. PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROHIBITED.
Punitive damages may not be awarded in any action arising out of a
publication or broadcast which is alleged to be false and defamatory.
SECTION 4. ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In any action arising out of a publication or broadcast which is alleged
to be false and defamatory, the court shall award the prevailing party rea-
sonable attorney's fees, except that-
(I) the court may reduce or disallow the award of attorney's fees if it
determines that there is an overriding reason to do so; and
(2) the court shall not award attorney's fees against a defendant which
proves that it exercised reasonable efforts to ascertain that the publication
or broadcast was not false and defamatory or that it published or broadcast
a retraction not later than 10 days after the action was filed.
SECTION 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This Act shall apply to any cause of action which arises on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
261. Id. § l(a)(3).
262. Id. § 1(c).
263. Id. § l(b). See generally Note, The Defamed Reputation: Will Declaratory
Judgment Bill provide Vindication?, 13 J. LEGiS. 72 (1986). See also Barrett,
Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REv. 847 (1986).
264. H.R. 2846 § l(d)(1).
265. Id. at §l(d)(2).
266. Id, at § 4.
267. The basic authority under which Congress could enact such a bill is un-
clear. Is the regulation of such publications permitted by the Commerce Clause,
United States Constitution Article I, § 7, cl.3? Or, is the bill rooted in the fact that
it protects first and fourteenth amendment rights?
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flies in the face of the plaintiff's seventh amendment rights. As the bill is
drafted, a plaintiff who has suffered financial loss and severe mental distress
related to his loss of reputation could be precluded from money damages
because the media defendant chooses to designate the action as one for a
declaratory judgment of falsity.28 Even if the media defendant was inspired
by common law malice, by converting the action into one of equity, it would
be shielded from all financial liability, and what is even more surprising in
the bill, punitive damages may never be awarded in any defamation action
against a media defendant. 269 It may be argued that awarding attorney's fees
to the prevailing party would discourage "nuisance suits" and promote media
responsibility. Conversely, such awards may have a chilling effect on both
the defamed plaintiff and the media defendant. The plaintiff may well be
reluctant to initiate a defamation action if there is the risk that he will be
judged not to have proven the falsity of a publication with clear and con-
vincing evidence, and consequently be burdened with having to pay the po-
tentially large fees charged by both his own attorneys and those for the media
defendant. 270 Also, some media defendants of modest resources, e.g., small
town newspapers, periodicals with very limited circulation or local radio
stations, may hesitate to publish anything but the most meticulously re-
searched and documented stories in fear that as a result of a good faith
mistake they may be liable for large legal fees incurred in the course of an
action for such a declaratory judgment.
H.R. 2846, as drafted, attempts by means of a codified national defa-
mation law to provide the defamed public official or public figure with a
simple, relatively inexpensive procedure whereby the current difficulties faced
by such plaintiffs may be avoided. However, the many problems inherent in
the proposed bill would not seem to render it a viable solution to be available
in the foreseeable future.
D. Use of Summary Judgment
Resort to a motion for summary judgment at an early stage in a defa-
mation action for money damages would seem to offer both plaintiff and
media defendant an early opportunity for a final determination of the action.
268. H.R. 2846 § l(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
right for an action for money damages for libel and slander: "The Seventh Amend-
ment ... entitled the parties to a jury trial in actions for damages to a person or
property, for libel and slander, for recovery of land, and for conversion of personal
property." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970).
269. H.R. 2846 § 3. If the only damages a media defendant might suffer
would be a series of probably not highly publicized declaratory judgments, because
the defendant would so elect in all suits against it, grossly careless reporting would
be encouraged.
270. See supra note 233.
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In practice the use of the summary judgment proceeding works almost ex-
clusively to the benefit of the media defendant. Only in the most extraor-
dinary circumstances can a plaintiff have in his possession evidence that could
convince a judge to render a decision in his favor, e.g., a written admission
or deposition testimony that the media defendant had spitefully set out to
harm the plaintiff's reputation. 271
In its reversal in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the Supreme Court observed
in dictum: "The proof of 'actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind
to question ... and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition, ' 272
and noted that the district court had said that in determining whether New
York Times malice could be proved, "summary judgment may well be the
'rule' rather than the 'exception.' ' 27 Despite the Hutchinson Court's obser-
271. An example of such a damaging admission, although not relied on in a
summary judgment motion, is a section of Reverend Jerry Falwell's pre-trial depo-
sition of Hustler publisher Larry Flynt:
Q. Do you recognize that in having published what you did in this ad,
you were attempting to convey to the people who read it that Reverend
Falwell was just as you characterized him, a liar?
A. He's a glutton.
Q. How about a liar?
A. Yeah. He's a liar, too.
Q. How about a hypocrite?
A. Yeah.
Q. That's what you wanted to convey?
A. Yeah.
Q. And didn't it occur to you that if it wasn't true, you were attacking
a man in his profession?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you appreciate, at the time that you wrote 'okay' or approved
this publication, that for Reverend Falwell to function in his livelihood,
and in his commitment and career, he has to have an integrity that peo-
ple believe in? Did you not appreciate that?
A. Yeah.
Q. And wasn't one of your objectives to destroy that integrity, or harm
it, if you could?
A. To assassinate it.
Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986). However, the jury, finding
that no reasonable person would believe the parody, returned a verdict for the defend-
ants on the libel claim. See supra note 182.
272. 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979). See supra note 89; see also Westmoreland
v. CBS, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M.
KAE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CwVIL 2D § 2730, at 240-41 (1983).
273. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1330 (W.D. Wis. 1977),
aff'd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). In Wasserman v.
Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970),
Judge Wright, in a concurring opinion, reflected the liberal rule:
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan makes actual malice a constitutional issue
to be decided in the first instance by the trial judge in applying the Times
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vation, subsequent studies have shown that the success of media defendants
at the summary judgment stage has not been affected by the Hutchinson
Court's dictum.274
Traditionally, summary judgment has been considered by courts to be
an extraordinary remedy, not to be granted as a matter of course. According
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment shall be granted
when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, ' 275 but "an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. ' 276 Rule 56 does not state that a plaintiff must meet a certain
burden of proof at the motion for summary judgment level. The public figure
plaintiff's argument is that to require him to establish actual malice with
convincing clarity by reference to depositions and other papers at this level
precludes him from discovering the media defendant's state of mind at the
time of publishing, a fact central to the very concept of New York Times
malice, and something extremely difficult to establish without a trial.
In Calder v. Jones, the United States Supreme Court stated that "[w]e
have already declined in other contexts to grant special procedural protections
to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional
protections embodied in the substantive laws. ' 277 Nevertheless, the Liberty
Lobby Court was "convinced that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a
motion for summary judgment ... necessarily implicates the substantive
evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits."27 8
By requiring the public figure plaintiff to establish actual malice on the part
of the media defendant with clear and convincing evidence at the level of a
motion for summary judgment, the value to the plaintiff of such a motion
is almost completely diminished.
test of actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth. Unless the court
finds, on the basis of pretrial affidavits, depositions or other documentary
evidence that the plaintiff can prove actual malice in the Times sense, it
should grant summary judgment for the defendant.
424 F.2d at 922.
274. See Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin No. 12 (Winter 1984), ana-
lyzing 136 summary judgment motions from 1982 through 1984 following the Hutch-
inson decision. Media defendants' summary judgment motions were granted in 74%
of all the cases; at trial level, the defendants prevailed in 80076 of the cases; on appeal,
the defendants' success rate was 66%Vo. Id. at 1. When motions for summary judgment
are made by media defendants against public figure plaintiffs, 80% of such motions
were granted; in actions involving private persons, 65% were granted. Id. at 2.
275. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
276. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(e).
277. 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984).
278. 54 L.W. 4758 (1986) (adopting the rationale of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972)); see supra notes 123-32 and
accompanying text.
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VII. THE JuDIcIAL DECLARATION OF FALSITY
Faced with the insurmountable hurdles erected by New York Times, St.
Amant and Tornillo, the plaintiff is further constrained by the current law
of defamation to seek only one remedy: money damages. For the plaintiff,
it is an "all or nothing" situation; for the media defendant, the time and
cost of defending defamation actions and the threat of large verdicts remain.
Would it not be possible for courts to initiate procedural changes which
would afford the plaintiff a remedy without jeopardizing the media defend-
ant's first amendment rights? The added protection which New York Times
and its progeny afford the media to ensure its constitutional riglts and to
guarantee "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 279 public debate has been
almost uniformly referred to as a "privilege," procedurally an affirmative
defense raised by the defendant as an excuse or justification for conduct that
otherwise would be tortious. "'Privilege' is the modern term applied to those
considerations which avoid liability where it might otherwise follow. 280 In
other words, there is no cause of action, no basis for liability. The privilege
is dependent upon the motives or purpose of the actor. If after inquiry it is
established that the defendant acted in good faith or to further an interest
of such societal import that protection is granted as a matter of law, the
plaintiff's suit must be dismissed32'
An immunity, on the other hand, exists when an actor is absolutely
protected from civil liability, in the form of money damages, despite the
actor's evil motive, recklessness or negligence. The common law concentrated
on the status of the defendant and his relation to the plaintiff and, in certain
situations, determined that the interests of society demanded that, even though
the defendant had acted tortiously, his status required that he escape liability
for his wrongful act. 282 The status may be such that the immunity is absolute
and shields against all liability in all circumstances, as is the case with gov-
ernmental or sovereign immunity, as the 1907 statement of Justice Holmes
explains: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal con-
ception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends."283 This immunity from suit is absolute, unless it is af-
279. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
280. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 8, at 108-09 (citing RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 (1965)).
281. Booth & Brother v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 188 (1906) ("There is no
justification for a tort. The so-called justification is an exceptional fact which shows
that no tort was committed.").
282. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 45A
(1979).
283. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); see also Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82 at 104-05 (1821).
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firmatively waived, but when extended to government officials it attaches
only when the tortious act is connected with official duties. 2 4 In defamation
actions, time and again executive officers of government have been held
immune from suit.285 Yet surely the underlying wrongful act is tortious and
the cause of action remains, although the defamer is shielded from liability
for money damages.
Why have the courts not approached the status enjoyed by the media
in the same way as they approach that of government officials? The Gertz
Court essentially tried to arrive at a balance between the individual's right
to reputation and the protection of a free press, but the post-Gertz decisions
reveal how unsuccessful that attempt was. Rather than concentrating on the
status of the plaintiff and the malice standard, courts should consider the
status of the defendant, the essence of the defamation, viz., the falsity of
the publication, and the relation of the defendant to the individual plaintiff.
The interests of society demand that the media be protected from defamation
actions for money damages only when it has not acted "with knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth." When so viewed the protection
emerges as an "immunity, ' 2 6 not a "privilege." The underlying tortious act
is not rendered non-tortious, but rather remains a defamation. One cannot
maintain that a private citizen who happens to be a member of the media is
"privileged" to defame individuals, but one can maintain that a member of
the media who harms the reputation of an individual by a false publication
should be shielded from liability for money damages because of the impor-
tance of his contributions to the growth of a free society. From this view-
point, New York Times and its progeny may be viewed as holding that a
media defendant is immune from suit by a public official or public figure
plaintiff unless such plaintiff can prove with convincing clarity that the media
defendant acted with common law malice, knowledge of falsity, or reckless
disregard of the truth. 21
284. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Barr extended the absolute immunity
to all federal officers. Some states follow the Barr rationale and have extended the
immunity to minor state officials, e.g., New York. See Sheridan v. Cresona, 14
N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359, N.Y.S.2d 161 (1964).
285. See, e.g., Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 275
U.S. 530 (1927) (Secretary of Treasury not liable for libel of government employee);
Blair v. Walker, 64 I1. 2d, 349 N.E.2d 385 (1976) (governor not liable for defamatory
press release).
286. The use of "immunity" as the more accurate term rather than "privilege"
was suggested over fifty years ago. See Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L, REv.
314, 318-19 (1935); see also Evans, Legal Immunity for Defamation, 24 MNN. L,
RiEv. 607, 613 (1940). The courts, however, have not adopted it.
287. Such a view fails short of the "absolute immunity" favored by Justice
Black in New York Times (see supra note 45 and accompanying text), for the im-
munity would not apply to all defamations under all circumstances.
19871
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
While precluding money damages as a remedy, New York Times and
subsequent decisions are silent concerning the availability of other remedies, 28
yet courts have not had difficulty in affording an alternate remedy to a
plaintiff in suits against judges who are immune from suits for money dam-
ages for acts performed in their judicial capacity. For almost 400 years the
doctrine of judicial immunity has been part of the common law.289 American
judges have always been protected by immunity, provided that their acts are
judicial "and within the very general scope of their jurisdiction. ' ' 29° The
immunity attaches even though the official act complained of was done in
bad faith, maliciously or corruptly. 29' The cause of action against the judge
existed, but he was immune from suit for money damages. Nevertheless, in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, the King's Bench issued
prerogative writs to impose collateral control on judges of rival courts,29 2
and the United States Federal Circuits have held that judicial immunity does
not bar injunctive relief against a judge for a judicial act within his juris-
diction. 293
In Pulliam v. Allen, 294 the United States Supreme Court directly ad-
dressed the doctrine of judicial immunity under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.29S A Virginia magistrate imposed bail on persons
288. Occasional references have been made, e.g., by Justice White in Gertz
and Justice O'Connor in Hepps. See supra notes 91-92, 229 and accompanying text.
289. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 159-60 (3d ed. 1945).
290. PROSSER AN4D KEATON, supra note 8, at 1057; see, e.g., Stump v. Spark-
man, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), reh'g denied, 436 U.S. 951 (1978) (judge who refused to
give a hearing to a 15 year-old girl before ordering her sterilized held to be absolutely
immune from suit for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because his
order was a "judicial act"). But see Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978)
(judge who brought coffee vendor before him in handcuffs because coffee tasted bad,
found liable for compensatory and punitive damages because his act was totally non-
judicial). See generally Black, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Im-
munity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879.
291. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872); Scott v. Stans-
field, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868).
292. See I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 226-31 (7th ed. 1956).
293. See In re Justices of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1982);
Heimbach v. Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1979); Timmerman v. Brown, 528
F.2d 811, 812 (4th Cir. 1975); WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand, 658 F.2d 420, 423 (6th Cir.
1981); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938
(1980); Koen v. Long, 428 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923
(1971); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1982).
294. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
295. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
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arrested for non-jailable misdemeanors and incarcerated them if the bail was
not met. The district court enjoined the practice and awarded attorney's fees
against the magistrate under 42 U.S.C. section 1988.296 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed. 29 In a 5 to 4 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
and noted that there has never been a rule of absolute judicial immunity
from all prospective relief and the absence of such absolute immunity has
not had a "chilling effect on judicial independence." 298 Noting that no United
States Court of Appeals has ever barred injunctive relief,299 the Court rei-
terated the requirements of equitable relief, "a showing of an inadequate
remedy at law and of a serious risk of irreparable harm," 3°° and noted that
there is only minimal risk that judges will be harassed and constrained from
acting independently as a result of the possibility of injunctive relief.30 Hold-
ing that "judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against
a judicial officer acting in [his or] her jurisdiction, ' 30 2 the Court rejected the
magistrate's contention that the awarding of attorney's fees functionally was
the same as awarding money damages3 3 and affirmed the award of legal
fees. Justice Powell, in a vigorous dissent, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined, decried the effect of the threat of
burdensome litigation upon a judge's independence, "particularly in cases
where the decision is likely to be unpopular, ' '304 and noted that the threat
increases when the prevailing plaintiff may be entitled to attorney's fees. 305
If attorney's fees awarded under section 1988 continue to escalate, the "chill-
ing effect" upon judicial independence may indeed become a reality.
Just as injunctive relief has been awarded against judges enjoying im-
munity, so too equitable relief should be made available to individuals de-
famed by a media defendant enjoying the immunity afforded by New York
Times. Any plaintiff, regardless of his classification as a public official,
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
296. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 reads in part as follows: "In any action or proceeding
to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title...
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
297. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
298. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 537.
299. Id.
300. Id. (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959)).
301. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 537.
302. Id. at 541-42.
303. Id. at 543.
304. Id. at 554 (Powell, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 555-57. Note also that hourly rates of $95 to $105 (total fee, $79,312)
for second and third year associates under § 1988 have been upheld. See Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). State judges have been found liable for substantial
attorney's fees. See Morrison v. Ayoob, No. 78-267 (W.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d
1100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984).
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public figure or private individual, should be able to elect a judicial decla-
ratory judgment of the falsity of the publication in lieu of money damages.
At the trial level, let the burden of proof remain upon the plaintiff as to
defamatory character and falsity of some material fact which he would have
to prove with clear and convincing evidence. In the interests of encouraging
full public debate, the media defendant would still be provided with a slight
advantage. There is no reason to return to the strict liability standard of the
common law of defamation which actually was a contradiction to the tra-
ditional tort rules as to burden of proof.3 6 In light of the strong dissent in
Pulliam, attorney's fees should be borne by each party since a sizeable award
for legal fees may be construed as the equivalent of an award for money
damages. 07 All of the media defendant's constitutional rights would be pre-
served in any action for money damages, but such rights would in fact be
irrelevant in an action for a judicial declaration of falsity.
The judicial declaratory judgment, favored by the Schumer Bill as a
remedy to be elected in defamation actions, has been a recognized action for
many years. 0 8 While there has been controversy over making this remedy
available concurrently with money damages in the same action, there is a
strong tradition allowing the plaintiff to choose the time and place of his
action, and since the choice of the declaratory judgment remedy would result
in a final judgment as to the truth or falsity of the publication, there would
be no reason for a plaintiff to elect the remedy should he feel he has at hand
the "clear and convincing" evidence necessary to prove New York Times
malice unless he wishes to avoid the time and expense of a long litigation.
Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
"The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment
for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." 3°9 The authorities in
general argue that the availability of money damages is no bar to an action
for a declaratory judgment.31 0 Even though a court may, in its discretion, 3"
306. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
307. The "Schumer Bill" would allow attorney's fees to be awarded to the
prevailing party. See supra note 260. Other proponents of the availability of thejudicial declaration of falsity would also award legal fees. See, e.g., Franklin, Good
Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. Rxv.
1, 36 (1983). An award of fees has also been proposed as an element of a possible
remedy to be afforded an individual defamed by one possessing "executive privilege."
See Becht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAry. L. REv.
1127, 1170 (1962).
Legal fees incurred in an action for a declaration of falsity would generally be
very significantly lower than in an action for money damages. However, it is con-
ceivable that expenses incurred in acquiring evidence on the issue of falsity may, in
some instances, be quite high.
308. See, e.g., F. JAMms & G. HAZARD, CIVI. PROCEDURE 28-32 (2d ed. 1977).
309. FED. R. Crv. P. 57.
310. See, e.g., C. WmGHT, A. MILLER & M. KAN, supra note 272, § 2758, at
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refuse to allow an action for a declaratory judgment, especially when a better
or more effective remedy is available, 312 in a defamation action against a
media defendant, money damages involving expensive and exhaustive liti-
gation requiring the frequently impossible burden of proving New York Times
malice with clear and convincing evidence cannot usually be deemed a "better
or more effective" remedy than the relatively simple, inexpensive declaration
of falsity which goes to the very essence of the cause of action - the pub-
lication of a falsity about the plaintiff which harmed his reputation.
Despite the occasional suggestion that a judicial declaratory judgment
of falsity should be available as a vindication remedy," 3 a declaratory judg-
ment has not been an available remedy for plaintiffs in defamation actions,
although oddly enough, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
a similar type of relief was available as a common form of action in the
Justice of the Peace Courts in certain Arkansas counties.31 4 A person who
claimed to be defamed would file a "lie bill" against the alleged defamer.
There would follow a trial" 5 on the issues of falsity and defamation, and if
621 ("Existence of another adequate remedy does not bar a declaratory judgment.");
see also F. J4ivms & G. HAZARD, supra note 308, at 31 ("[W]here the issues tendered
for declaratory judgment will be settled in that suit, there seems to be little if any
justification in the ordinary case for letting the putative wrongdoer deprive the injured
party of his traditional tactical advantage by bringing an independent action for
declaratory judgment."); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); United
Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Hanes Corp. v. Millard,
531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
311. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494, reh'g
denied, 317 U.S. 704 (1942).
312. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 272, § 2758, at 623;
see also City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 927 (1976).
313. See, e.g., Note, An Alternative to the General-Damage Award for Def-
amation, 20 STN. L. RPv. 504 (1968); Hulme, Vindicating Reputation: An Alter-
native to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, 30 Am. U.L. REv. 375 (1981);
Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18
U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1983).
314. See Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REv. 423, 423-25
(1952).
315. There is an issue as to whether a declaratory judgment is legal or equitable,
i.e., whether a jury trial is a matter of right under the seventh amendment. In 1791,
declaratory judgments were unknown so resort to history cannot resolve the issue.
[T]he solution that has been worked out to this problem is to look to the
kind of action in which the issue involved would have been decided if there
were no declaratory judgment procedure and to see whether the issue would
have been triable of right to a jury in that action. If there would have been
a right to jury trial on the issue if it had arisen in an action other than for
a declaratory judgment, it must be tried to a jury on demand in the dec-
laratory action. There is no right to jury trial if, absent the declaratory
procedure, the issue would have arisen in a proceeding in equity or in ad-
miralty.
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 272, § 2769, at 758-60.
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the plaintiff prevailed, the judgment would be rendered in the nature of a
declaratory judgment, in accordance with which the defendant would be
directed to sign a statement that he had lied about the plaintiff. The origins
of the lie bill and how widely it was used are obscure. 3 6 The procedure was
uncomplicated, the time and expense of prolonged discovery and litigation
was avoided, and the plaintiff's reputation was restored in the eyes of the
community.
Some courts have already afforded the allegedly defamed plaintiff the
opportunity of having a judicial determination of the defamatory nature and
falsity of the objectionable publication by instructing the jury to answer
questions seriatim as part of the deliberation process, but this opportunity
was given the plaintiff only at the very end of the lengthy litigation process.
In Israeli Minister Ariel Sharon's suit against Time Magazine,31 7 the district
court judge in a 65-page charge to the jury provided the jury with a verdict
sheet containing questions to be answered. The jury was first to determine
whether the plaintiff had proved by a preponderance of the evidence whether
the disputed paragraph"' when read in context defamed him.31 9 Secondary
questions concerned whether Sharon "consciously intended" or "actively
encouraged" the Phalangists to murder non-combatants. 320 The jury decided
that Time had defamed Sharon and that the paragraph meant that he had
"consciously intended" the acts of revenge.3 2' The Sharon jury then consid-
ered whether "any actionable defamatory statement contained in the chal-
lenged paragraph was false in some material respect." 322 Specifically, the
question to be answered was "whether the plaintiff has proved by clear and
convincing evidence the falsity of the facts in the paragraph," 323 "that he
did not engage in any discussion with the Phalangists prior to the massacre
316. See Leflar, supra note 314, at 423-25.
317. See generally Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
318. The paragraph read:
One section of the report, known as Appendix B (the 'Kahan report,' the
result of the Israeli government's investigation into the massacres in the
Palestinian camps), was not published at all, mainly for security reasons.
That section contains the names of several intelligence agents referred to
elsewhere in the report. Time has learned that it also contains further details
about Sharon's visit to the Gemayel family on the day after Bashir Gemayel's
assassination. Sharon reportedly told the Gemayels that the Israeli army
would be moving into West Beirut and that he expected the Christian forces
to go into the Palestinian refugee camps. Sharon also reportedly discussed
with the Gemayels the need for the Phalangists to take revenge for the
assassination of Bashir, but the details of the conversation are not known.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at B4, col. 3.
319. See Charge to Jury by Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, Tr., at 4087-88.
320. Id. at 4088.
321. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1985, at B7, col. 1.
322. Charge to Jury, supra note 319, Tr., at 4031.
323. Id. at 4088.
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of the need to take revenge for the death of Bashir Gemayel. ' ' 324 The jury
answered the question in the affirmative. 32 Only after determination as to
defamatory meaning and falsity was the jury to consider actual malice 326 and
damages. The jury found that Time did not publish the false and defamatory
paragraph with "serious doubts as to its truth, ' 327 i.e., with New York Times
malice. Time magazine issued a statement that "Time has won it. ' ' 328 Minster
Sharon declared, "We came here to prove that Time Magazine lied . . .
(a)nd we managed to prove that Time Magazine did lie." '3 29
The trial judge effectively provided Minister Sharon with a declaratory
judgment of falsity, but while providing the defamed plaintiff with proce-
dural help to vindicate his reputation, such an approach, however, falls far
short of providing a simple effective remedy as an alternative to money
damages. Plaintiff Sharon still had initially to sue for money damages, had
to entail the great expense of discovery and litigation, and remained open
to an adverse summary judgment prior to trial because of an inability, as a
matter of law, to establish a prima facie case on all the elements necessary
to be proven at trial.330
What most defamed plaintiffs really want is an opportunity to restore
their reputations in the eyes of the community. After a media defendant has
refused to retract or to apologize in a manner acceptable to the plaintiff,
our current law of defamation leaves the individual no choice but to follow
the same arduous path as Minister Sharon. The only purpose of the judicial
declaration of falsity would be to obtain public acknowledgment that a false
statement has been made about the plaintiff by the defendant. The granting
of the declaratory judgment as a possible remedy is in accord with the very
policy behind the use of such a procedure, as Professor Borchard, a co-
draftsman of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, long ago observed:
The two principal criteria guiding the policy in favor of rendering declaratory
judgments are (1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying
and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate and
afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to
the proceeding.33
Federal courts, with the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,332 and all the
states, with either the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 333 or similar state
324. Id.
325. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
326. Charge to Jury, supra note 319, Tr., at 4088-89.
327. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
328. Id. at B4, col. 1.
329. Id. at Al, col. 2.
330. See Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 921-22 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970).
331. E. BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDrMENTS 299 (2d ed. 1941).
332. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982 & Supp. 1986); Id. at § 2201 (1982).
333. See 12 U.L.A. 85 (Supp. 1986). The Uniform Act has been adopted by
forty states, the United States Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.
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statutes,3 4 have existing declaratory judgment legislation. Making the remedy
available to a media-defamed plaintiff would effectively eliminate the rele-
vance of the plaintiff's status as a public official, public figure, or private
person as well as the defendant's status as a member of the media whose
first amendment rights could be infringed upon. Let the courts of the nation
provide the plaintiff with what he desires most-a restored reputation, some-
thing an action for money damages with its almost insurmountable hurdles
does not provide.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, the effect of the United States Supreme Court decisions
concerning media-defamed plaintiffs have been examined in light of the es-
sence of defamation law - publication of falsity. In balancing the reputa-
tional interests of the individual against the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and a free press, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ignored the issue
of falsity and, in its attempts to preserve wide-open debate on public issues,
concentrated exclusively on the status of the plaintiff and the malice standard
to be applied in any defamation action. In St. Amant v. Thompson, the
barrier in the path of the defamed public official and, after Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, in the way of the public figure as well, was raised to an almost
insurmountable height-leaving the plaintiff with no practical remedy by
means of which his reputation could be effectively vindicated. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. only added more confusion to the state of defamation law, as
the Supreme Court in attempting to bring some relief to the media-defamed
private person plaintiff, left open more new questions than it answered old
ones.
Post-Gertz decisions tried to resolve some of the problems left open by
New York Times and its progeny, but due to the Supreme Court's continued
preoccupation with determining the applicable standard according to the
plaintiff's status, little if any help was afforded the plaintiff, with the ex-
ception of Herbert v. Lando where it was held that in the pre-trial discovery
process the plaintiff may inquire into the thought processes and editorial
decisions of a media defendant. Even in those instances where the Supreme
Court and circuit courts have addressed the aspect of the falsity of the
publication, the public official and public figure received no relief since they
334. The remaining ten states have adopted statutes which are similar. See
ALASKA STAT. § 22.05.010 (1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1060 (West 1982); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-29 (West 1960); HAW. REv. STAT. § 632-1 (1976); KAN. Crv.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-1701 (Vernon 1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 418.040-.090
(Bobbs-Merrill 1972); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 24.264 (West 1981); Miss. R. Civ.




continued to be restricted to only one remedy: money damages. The post-
Gertz years also saw the development of and acceptance in some circuits of
potentially threatening doctrines in defamation law, e.g., the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine, the incremental harm theory and the subsidiary libel doc-
trine. Only in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps did the United States
Supreme Court squarely address the essence of the defamation action and
provided a hint that a single, more effective remedy may be available to the
media-defamed plaintiff.
The various means proposed in past years to ease the burden of the
media defamed plaintiff and to assist him in obtaining what he most wants,
a restored reputation, have not offered any alternative remedy. But, if the
special constitutional protection enjoyed by the media is viewed as an "im-
munity," rather than as a "privilege," the underlying cause of action remains
and the immunity only precludes an award of money damages. An alternative
remedy is available: a declaratory judgment of falsity, by means of which
any media-defamed plaintiff, who either cannot prove New York Times mal-
ice with clear and convincing evidence or who does not want to pursue such
a course of action, may gain his end purpose in a defamation action: the
restoration of the good name that was altered or besmirched. As Iago opined:
Good name in man and woman...
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; . ..
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
"Othello," Act III, Scene 3.
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